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Abstract           
 
Space exploration is an area of growing international interest and activity. China is an 
emerging space power, has become increasingly active in space exploration, and has 
advocated for further international cooperation in various space activities. To identify 
opportunities for international cooperation proposed frameworks have used technical and 
policy parameters to locate suitable partners for specific projects. With the goal of more 
accurately informing these frameworks this paper will explore China’s policy parameters 
by measuring the degree to which the international environment enables and constrains 
China’s space exploration ambitions. Specifically, this study analyzes two Chinese 
civilian space exploration programs and three cooperative space projects with 
international partners as case studies to identify domestic and foreign policy 
considerations informing China’s position in. It is found that in addition to national 
prestige economic development and progress in science and technology development are 
major motivations for China’s selection of space exploration activities. 
 
Key words: space exploration; international cooperation; science and technology; China; 
Chinese foreign policy 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Human presence in space is expanding. Space exploration requires a significant 
allocation of human and financial resources, and therefore offers great potential for 
countries to collaborate in a meaningful domain. Specifically, international cooperation in 
space exploration can be used as a proxy to solve global challenges and to strengthen 
peaceful relations between countries. 
China has invested significant resources into their space program and is quickly 
becoming a space superpower. Among their achievements are establishing a space 
laboratory, developing advanced space launch capabilities, and a human spaceflight 
program whose success made China the third country to successfully launch a human into 
space. 
Although cooperation in space exploration is recognized as a means to create 
significant benefits for all partners various barriers including ineffective communication, 
dual-use technologies and technology transfer, and practical impediments prevent the 
international community from more extensive cooperation. China faces additional 
challenges in expanding its partnerships stemming from the role of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) and from its civil-military integration (CMI) policy. Overcoming 
these barriers is key to deepening China’s integration into the existing framework of 
international cooperation. Considering China’s current status as an emerging space 
power, their participation in cooperative and collaborative projects is increasingly 
important to exploit the potential of international cooperation. 
To adequately explore the issue of international cooperation in space exploration 
mechanisms for multilateral cooperation and specific proposals for cooperation will be 
discussed. The goal of this study will be to describe China’s policy parameter 
considerations i.e. the political utility gained by China from participating in 
internationally coordinated projects. The contribution of this work will be to provide a 
more detailed account of how China calculates its political utility. These findings can be 
used to better inform analytical frameworks and collaboration architectures used to 
identify opportunities for international cooperation in space exploration.  
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Cooperation- and collaboration-enhancing initiatives for space exploration 
activities are difficult to facilitate. A plethora of highly sensitive issues that affect 
national security and economic development are intrinsically connected with space 
exploration. Per aspera ad astra – “through hardship to the stars” - captures the essence 
of the challenge this study aspires to help solve. 
 
1.1 Thesis overview 
This thesis aspires to examine how China can increase cooperation with existing 
spacefaring countries in space exploration missions. This examination is guided by two 
goals: first will be to better understand domestic factors affecting how China’s civilian 
space program sets and pursues it’s space exploration ambitions; second will be to 
identify opportunities for cooperation in a changing international environment. 
This study will build upon literature regarding multilateral coordination 
mechanisms and collaboration architectures used to facilitate cooperation in space 
exploration. This work will draw upon liberal international relations theory, which 
considers complex domestic bargaining processes and the influence of the international 
environment as constituting national space policy. Specifically, the theory will inform the 
structure of this paper. Finally, there has been much literature on the benefits and barriers 
countries face in international cooperation. A selection of benefits and barriers is 
presented first to provide a background understanding.  
The unique contribution of this thesis will be to present synthesized findings that 
elaborate on the political utility calculations that most strongly affect China’s attitude 
towards varying degrees of international cooperation. In this pursuit this study will look 
at two of China’s space programs and three space projects for which China cooperated 
with an international partner to answer the following research questions: 
 
1. What domestic policy considerations influence how China sets its space 
exploration goals? 
2. How does the international environment enable and constrain opportunities for 
international cooperation in space exploration available to China? 
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1.1.1 Case study method, design, and parameters 
Case studies are a standard tool for investigation used by social science scholars. 
Cases can be designed in different ways as to appropriately capture information from the 
object of study. The case study method is applied for research that covers contextual or 
complex multivariate conditions, relies on multiple sources of evidence, and can 
accommodate causal complexity by analyzing condition in which outcomes occur.1 Yin 
(2012) categorizes case study research strategies into exploratory, descriptive, and 
explanatory, where descriptive case studies “can offer rich and revealing insights into the 
social world of a particular case” whose insights can, when added to the stock of related 
case studies, achieved greater importance.2 
A descriptive case study is an appropriate design given the scope of this paper. 
The benefit of investigating China’s space program and international collaboration 
mechanisms for space exploration using this method are related to the flexibility in 
addressing complex causality. Cooperation in space exploration is a multidimensional 
phenomenon that can provoke several explanations for a particular outcome and therefore 
requires this flexibility.  
The aim of this study is to describe China’s policy parameters that can be used to 
better inform analytical frameworks and collaboration architectures that identify 
opportunities for cooperation. A descriptive case study can achieve this through a 
constitutive portrayal of decision- and policy-making processes in China’s civilian space 
program.  As Simons states: “the aim is particularization – to present a rich portrayal of a 
single setting to inform practice, establish the value of the case and/or add to knowledge 
of a specific topic”.3 This case study will add to our understanding of China as an 
emerging space power and their position in the shifting ‘real-world’ context for space 
actors.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Yin, Robert K. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Sage Publications, 2003. Print. Pg xiii; 31. 
2 Yin (2012): 49 
3 Simons (2009): 24 
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The parameters of this research will focus on state-led, multilateral international 
collaboration mechanisms and space exploration activities by China’s civilian space 
program.  
 
1.1.2 Data sources 
The sources used to investigate the thesis topic are consistent with sources 
traditionally used by other academics and professionals in researching space policy. The 
primary source documents used in this paper include official government documents, 
specifically the China’s Space Activities in 2011 White Paper, statements from 
authoritative space sector participants made at public conferences and as quoted in the 
media, conference proceedings and presentations, and several publications from the 
International Astronautical Congress (IAC). Primary sources published by main actors in 
China’s civilian space sector were also utilized.4 In addition contributions from secondary 
sources, including academic journals and think tank reports, were extensively consulted.  
There are a few noteworthy comments to be made on sources used in this paper. 
First, academic journals published only in Chinese were not consulted due to the author’s 
lack of proficiency in Mandarin. To partially offset this limitation an effort was made to 
include authoritative Chinese contributors who have published in English. Furthermore, 
articles whose author(s) conducted in-person interviews with Chinese space authorities 
were also consulted. It should be noted, however, that cross-cultural misinterpretations 
are frequent in strategic communications regarding space activities.5 This paper’s bias 
towards English-published sources therefore renders it susceptible to this concern.    
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The author collected official handout materials from CASIC, CASC, NSSC, and the CNSA and the 64th 
International Astronautical Congress in Beijing. 
5 Johnson-Freese, Joan. “Strategic communication with China: what message about space?” China Security 
2 (2006): pp. 37-58; Kulacki, Gregory and Joan Johnson-Freese. “Factual Errors in May 20, 2008 Written 
Statement from Ashley Tellis”. Email to United States – China Economic Security and Review 
Commission. 20 May 2008. Web. Accessed 20 September 2013.  
 http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/memo-to-uscc.pdf 
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1.2 Definition of key concepts 
The following two key concepts are used throughout the study. To ensure a 
common interpretation the scope of the terms are defined below.  
 
1.2.1 Space exploration 
Space exploration is often conflated with various space activities, particularly the 
exploitation of space resources. This understanding is misleading as by definition 
exploration operates on the frontiers of human expansion into space. This study will 
therefore interpret space exploration as the discovery, exploration, and investigation of 
celestial objects and phenomena through human and robotic spacecraft.  
Various supporting activities such as space sciences research, analogue training 
for astronauts, and space launch capabilities needed to conduct particular space 
exploration missions are captured in this definition. It is important to consider that 
supporting activities vary depending on project. For example human missions require 
extensive space life sciences preparations whereas robotic missions need only consider 
the effects of specific environments on its hardware.  
Finally the scope of this paper is limited to government-led civilian space 
activities. These parameters are appropriate as government actors dominate space 
exploration activities. Military and private sector space activities are considered insofar 
that they pertain to civilian space exploration; detailed elaboration on military and private 
sector space activities are not with the scope of this study.  
 
1.2.2 International cooperation and international collaboration 
International cooperation in space exploration can take form through bilateral, 
multilateral, or industry-led cooperation. To accommodate the various forms of 
cooperation this paper adopts a broad interpretation. International cooperation will be 
understood as state-led, which can then enable linkages between principal domestic 
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actors in the space industry including public actors, higher education actors, large 
industrial groups, and small and medium enterprises.6  
This paper will also distinguish between cooperation and collaboration. Whereas 
cooperation refers to agreements and linkages (horizontal) collaboration will refer to the 
degree to which each partner is assigned significant responsibilities (vertical). The 
responsibilities assigned to each partner include technical and policy considerations and 
often leads to an asymmetrical distribution. For example ‘lead partners’ may contribute a 
critical-path component, such as life-support systems on the International Space Station 
(ISS), while another partner may contribute a non-critical path component, such as a 
module for scientific experiments. Collaboration will be employed then to capture this 
difference in responsibility. 
 
1.3 Background 
1.3.1 Overview of the potential benefits of space exploration 
International cooperation in space exploration is challenging yet is considered an 
integral principle guiding human expansion into space. This research emphasizes 
coordination mechanisms and collaboration architectures used to facilitate international 
cooperation in space exploration. The first step in this process is to discuss the potential 
benefits of cooperation. The following section outlines a number of benefits that 
collaboration in space exploration can offer. This is not an exhaustive list but 
demonstrates several potential benefits.  
 
1.3.1.1 Sharing resources and risk 
Space exploration projects demand a significant allocation of resources, however 
the total amount of resources needed is difficult to estimate. The risk of rising project 
costs comes from difficulties in cost estimation. Cost estimation for space programs and 
projects has been shown to be problematic due to growing project complexity, mission 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For an elaboration on principal actors in the space economy industry see: OECD (2012), “Principal actors 
in the space economy”, in OECD Handbook on Measuring the Space Economy, OECD Publishing.  
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failures, managing growth, and controlling costs.7 Contracting mechanisms have also 
been found to have a downward bias on cost estimates.8 Furthermore methods used in 
cost estimation, parametric modeling being the most popular internationally, were also 
found to be inadequate due to an inability to predict the future and by having process 
replace judgment in decision making.9 These difficulties have led to cost overruns in the 
US space program to average over 45%, and is a problem most national space programs 
face.10 
International cooperation allows partners to leverage investments by sharing the 
cost burden of a project thereby spreading the risk of rising project costs among partners. 
One concern is that in this arrangement total project cost may be higher than if a country 
were to manage the project independently due to increased overhead costs associated 
with cooperation such as translation, communication, transporting hardware, and 
regulatory issues.11 However despite these increases it is mainly accepted that as per-
partner cost burden decreases in cooperative projects, per-partner utility increases.12 For 
example the ISS is a space laboratory that enables participating countries to conduct 
national space experiments. With the exception of the most technologically advanced and 
well-funded space programs, most countries do not have the technical ability or the 
monies required to fund equivalent projects.  
Major spacefaring nations acknowledge that the financial and technical resources 
required to explore space are so great that no one state could competitively pursue these 
activities autonomously.13 Sharing resources and risk allow partners to undertake more 
ambitious missions - major benefit afforded by international cooperation.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Keller, S., P. Collopy, and P. Componation. “What is wrong with space system cost models? A survey 
and assessment of cost estimating approaches.” Acta Astronautica 93 (2014); pp. 345-351 
8 Macauley, Molly K. “The supply of space infrastructure: issues in the theory and practice of estimating 
costs.” Space Policy 24 (2008); pp. 70-79. 
9 Keller, Collopy, and Compination (2014) 
10 Peeters, Walter and Bernd Madauss. “A proposed strategy against cost overruns in the space sector: The 
5C approach.” Space Policy 24 (2008): 80-89. 
11 Broniatowski, David et al. “A framework for evaluating international cooperation in space exploration.” 
Space Policy 24 (2008): 187; American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. George PJ, Pease GM, 
Tyburski TE. “A management model for international participation in space exploration missions.” AIAA 
1st space exploration conference, Orlando, FL, 2005. 
12 Center for Strategic and International Studies. Broniatowski, David, G. Ryan Faith, and Vincent G. 
Sabathier. “The Case for Managed International Cooperation in Space Exploration.” Washington DC, 
2006. Pg.2 
13 This is recognized by all ISECG participating agencies. 
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1.3.1.2 Data and knowledge sharing  
Data acquired from space science experiments and the increase in technological 
capacity that comes from developing space technologies to support space science 
investigations are two major motivations for exploring space. Data can be fetched in 
various ways including but not limited to remote-sensing satellites, robotic spacecraft, 
adding scientific experiment payloads to launch vehicles, and human exploration 
missions. Due to the significant technical and financial resources needed to support space 
exploration projects duplicative projects is a serious barrier to the cost effectiveness of 
global space activities. Duplication refers to a devotion of resources to a project whose 
objectives have already been achieved by another actor. This problem, and the solutions 
afforded by international cooperation, applies differently to space sciences and space 
technologies. 
Two instances in which duplication occurs in space sciences are from a lack of 
data exchange agreements and from an inability to compare data already acquired.  The 
problem therefore relates to sharing data already acquired as well as the methods used to 
gather the data. A case study on international cooperation in space life sciences research 
exemplifies this point.14 Data regarding the space environment’s effect on human 
physiology during and after space mission is crucial, non-sensitive information that is 
needed to support future long-term exploration missions. However it is difficult to 
generate this data due to cost considerations and the limited capacity of existing space 
platforms15. Duplication was therefore found to be very costly and creates a substantial 
opportunity cost due to the bottleneck of requests for space experiments.  
The main issue in regards to duplication for space technologies is interoperability. 
It is important that the hardware and software utilized by various space technologies be 
compatible with the space technologies developed by other international partners. 
Without this compatibility is would be impossible to have space assets work in synergy 
as each asset would be limited to their own system. The issue of interoperability has been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 McPhee, Jancy C., and Ronald J. White. “Advantages of international cooperation in space life sciences 
research.” Acta Astronautica 63 (2008): 776-782. 
15 Space platforms in this context refer to space infrastructure that can accommodate experiments. 
Examples include the ISS and the Tiangong space laboratory. 
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recognized as one of the most important challenges to address to ensure a sustainable 
human presence in space.16  
A case study on increasing the reliability of space solar arrays demonstrates that 
data exchange agreements and standardization of testing procedures also apply to space 
technologies.17 However it is important to consider that duplication in space technologies 
can also be seen as a positive in that it provides redundant systems. Redundant systems 
are a key factor in project sustainability because they can be used as a backup in case of 
failure.18 For example the Russian Soyuz capsule acted as a redundant space 
transportation system for US astronauts, which proved useful when the Shuttle program 
was decommissioned. Therefore within a certain degree redundant systems created 
(un)intentionally by duplicative efforts can be seen as a positive.  
International cooperation can address issues of duplication in space sciences by 
encouraging a standardization of testing procedures. Standardization ensures that data, 
whether collected collaboratively or separately, can be compared with datasets generated 
from other investigations.19 In regards to space technologies international cooperation is 
critical in facilitating interoperability of hardware and software systems.20 
Interoperability of space technologies is needed for future exploration activities and can 
be achieved through early coordination between partners.21  
Although cooperation in data and knowledge sharing can yield significant 
benefits, unwanted technology transfer and the potential of dual-use technologies must 
also be considered. The benefits of technology transfer and dual-usages are that they can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 International Space Exploration Coordination Group. The Global Exploration Roadmap. ISECG, 2011. 
38 pages. http://www.globalspaceexploration.org/documents 
17 Brandhorst, Henry .W., and Julie A. Rodiek. “Space solar array reliability: A study and 
recommendations.” Acta Astronautica 63 (2008): 1233-1238. 
18 NASA “Redundancy and Backup in Services & Systems” 
http://media.ihmc.us/capturethefuture/video/video.php?video=WilliamGerstenmaier-
HowHasTheCollaborationWithInternationalPartnersAtISSEvolved.mov&w=854&h=496&label=William%
20Gerstenmaier%20comments%20on%20How%20the%20Dependency%20among%20International%20Pa
rtners%20on%20ISS%20has%20Evolved&source=NASA  
19 Brandhorst and Rodiek (2008); McPhee and White (2008) 
20 International Space Exploration Coordination Group. The Global Exploration Strategy: The Framework 
for Coordination. ISECG, 2007. 25 pages. Pg 13. 
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/296751main_GES_framework.pdf 
21 Global Exploration Roadmap (2011): 22; The Global Exploration Strategy: Framework for Coordination 
(2007): 6; 13. 
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build the technological capability and can increase return on investment.22 However 
unwanted technology transfer and possible military applications of dual-use technologies 
are a significant concern to spacefaring countries.23 Balancing these issues has proven 
difficult, as is evidenced by the US-China relationship. 
 
1.3.1.3 Political sustainability 
Space exploration missions operate on long-term time horizons. As such there is 
an importance placed on establishing a predictable and sufficient dedication of resources 
to fulfill a country’s assumed responsibilities. The ability of a partner country to meet 
their obligations is susceptible to changes in domestic political support; this potential 
volatility in political support creates uncertainty in the ability of a partner to predictably 
contribute to long-term projects. Political sustainability refers to how susceptible a space 
exploration project is to cancellation due to a lack of political support to continue an 
investment of resources.  
Changes in political support have been measured using domestic political stability 
and the position of space exploration on the political agenda.24 These indicators gauge the 
ability of a country to participate in long-term projects. In measuring political stability a 
preference is given to countries with a low political rotation, as these types of political 
regimes can put forth a more stable space policy and commit the requisite amount of 
resources for long-term projects. The priority of space exploration on the political agenda 
can be estimated from official national space policy documents. These documents 
indicate the priorities and principles of national space policies and the role space 
exploration plays within the larger national space strategy. For example China, the United 
States, and Russia have strong ambitions for human exploration missions whereas Japan 
and Europe have a preference for science and technology-building focused projects.25  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The Global Exploration Strategy: Framework for Coordination (2007): 22. 
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International cooperation enhances political sustainability by adding diplomatic 
utility to the calculation of political support. If deciding to withdraw from an international 
cooperative project diplomatic utility would be calculated as the loss of diplomatic 
benefits as well as the negative effects on reputation.26 The degree to which the value of 
diplomatic utility can be used to justify the added costs of continued cooperation 
contributes to the project’s political sustainability. 
 
1.3.1.4 Diplomatic prestige 
Diplomatic prestige presents an opportunity to demonstrate leadership and 
technical ability on the international stage. Diplomatic prestige differs from diplomatic 
utility in that prestige refers to a leadership role that can be used as a diplomatic tool for 
soft power. Cooperation creates diplomatic prestige by allowing other countries to benefit 
from the accomplishments of another’s space program, thus demonstrating leadership. 
One way in which diplomatic prestige from space exploration can be used as a 
soft power diplomatic tool is in the value is derived from the symbolism of cooperation 
that demonstrates good relations between partners. An important demonstration of this is 
the Apollo-Soyuz space link-up that helped ease tensions at the height of the Cold War 
by bringing two superpowers into cautious cooperation.27 It was later revealed that 
diplomatic prestige played a key role in Moscow’s approval of the joint-orbital mission 
as Russia could be seen as an equal partner to the US who had the most advanced space 
program in the world.28 The effect of space exploration as a diplomatic tool for soft 
power can therefore be measured by the extent to which cooperation can be used as a 
proxy to implementing a policymaker’s agenda.29 
 
1.3.2 Barriers to international cooperation in space exploration 
 International cooperation in civilian space exploration has the potential to accrue 
many benefits to participating actors. There are however challenges that impede progress 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Broniatowski, Faith and Sabathier (2006) 
27 Sheehan, Michael. The International Politics of Space. New York: Routledge, 2007. Print. Pg. 14. 
28 “The real lessons of international cooperation in space.” Oberg, James. The Space Review. 18 July 2005. 
Web. Accessed 1 October 2013. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/413/1  
29 Broniatowski (2006): 2 
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in expanding international cooperation. This list is non-exhaustive and does not detail 
every challenge faced in regards to evaluating opportunities for international cooperation. 
It does however illustrate some of the major concerns the international community has 
about cooperating in space exploration.  
 
1.3.2.1 Practical impediments 
 The idea that international cooperation necessarily leads to cost savings is false. 
The main reason for this are the number of practical impediments that increase the ‘layers 
of complexity’ within a cooperative project. These challenges can arise from unaligned 
funding and programmatic cycles and from practical, in-field challenges faced by 
international teams working on a cooperative project. 
 Unaligned funding and programmatic cycles occur due to the different ways 
countries manage their national space agencies. This misalignment is caused by different 
political systems, but can also be due to unique cultural dimensions, specifically in 
relation to time orientation, power distance, gender roles, social orientation and 
uncertainty avoidance.30 An example of where these concerns have had tangible effect 
can be found in US National Research Council’s Vision and Voyages for Planetary 
Science in the Decade 2013-2022 that noted an inherent risk of international cooperation 
is that: “different space agencies use different planning horizons, funding approaches, 
selection processes, and data dissemination policies”.31 Furthermore technical 
specification, management, and implementation were all found to have added a layer of 
programmatic complexity to international missions.  
 Practical, in-field impediments have also signaled problems with international 
cooperation. For example the integration of ISS electrical power systems is a case that 
highlight problems in, inter alia, engineering and design change and verification.32 In 
regards to the former it was found that design changes were required to undergo such a 
thorough review process by all international partners affected that the cost of even minor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ehrenfreund, Pascale, Nicolas Peter, Kai-Uwe Schrogl, and John M. Logsdon. “Cross-cultural 
management supporting global space exploration.” Acta Astronautica 66 (2010): 245-256. 
 
31 United States National Research Council Committee on the Planetary Science Decadal Survey. Vision 
and Voyages for Planetary Science in the Decade 2013-2022. National Academies Press, 2011. 
32 George and Tyburski (2005) 
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changes were significant. Verification was also problematic due differences in acceptable 
levels of risk and differences in methods used to demonstrate compliance. 
 Addressing practical impediments is needed to promote project efficiency and 
therefore has placed emphasis on developing collaboration architectures that can reduce 
coordination costs.33 
 
1.3.2.2 Ineffective communication 
Miscommunications create misinformed perspectives on the ambitions of space 
actors. These communication problems have been noted at strategic and practical levels. 
Strategic communication signifies the numerous methods by which governments 
understand, engage, advise, and influence through communication strategies.34 When 
applied to space activities strategic communication is key in sending messages about the 
ambitions of one’s space program. A clear example of a lack of strategic communication 
regarding a country’s activities in space is seen in the US-China case. Johnson-Freese 
(2006; 2009) argues that space messages between the US and China have been distorted 
as a result of scholarly error and sensationalist spinning of Chinese actions.35 The 
consequences of these errors are misinformation or analyses with preordained 
conclusions, poor report credibility consequent of misinterpreted information, and the 
influencing of policymakers towards misguided actions. Tensions can be furthered by 
ineffective strategic communication that distorts information on current and future 
national space activities, creating mistrust between space actors.36  
As a possible solution it is recommended that engineers and scientist make sound 
technical assessments that inform political analyses so as to minimize decisions made on 
bad information.37 The problem of ineffective strategic communication however is an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33  Rendleman, James D., and J. Walter Faulconer. “Improving International Space Cooperation: 
Consideration for the USA”, Space Policy, vol. 24:3 (2010), p.143-151. Pg.18. 
34 This breakdown is taken from the 2004 Defense Science Board and used as a base definition in Johnson-
Freese’s works (2006; 2009). Specifically, strategic communication refers to: “understand global attitudes 
and cultures, engage in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions, advise policymakers, and 
influence attitudes and behavior” Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force 
on Strategic Communication (2004) pg.11. In Johnson-Freese (2006): 39. 
35 Johnson-Freese (2009): 53-56. 
36 Johnson-Freese (2006)  
37 Johnson-Freese (2009): 60. 
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ongoing problem required effort from all parties to accurately present one’s ambitions 
and to understand the ambitions of others.  
Other issues regarding ineffective communication have also been raised. Cross-
cultural management frameworks cite miscommunications in language, visions, 
negotiations, and management styles as reasons for failed collaborations.38 
Communication difficulties are also often cited as a significant practical challenge for 
cooperation at the sub-operation level, as George et al. (2005) noted from their 
experience working with the ISS: “Participants are on different continents, speak 
different languages and have culturally different expectations. These challenges must be 
overcome regardless of what notional management model is used”.39 
 
1.3.2.3 Dual-use technologies and unwanted technology transfer 
Space technologies have an intrinsic strategic quality that creates an ever-present 
possibility of dual-use application. Indeed some 95% of space technology is considered 
to have dual-use application.40 The best example of this is how space launch rockets can 
be easily transformed into ballistic missiles.41 As was mentioned earlier in this work two 
benefits of cooperation are building technological capability through technology transfer 
and achieving a higher return on investment from dual-use technologies. The concern 
here is that of a proliferation of sensitive technologies from unwanted technology transfer 
and undesired applications, specifically military applications, of dual-use technologies.  
Export control regimes are used to prevent the proliferation of sensitive items and 
technologies. Non-proliferation is recognized as an issue that must be solved at the 
international level. Space items are particularly sensitive within export control regimes as 
there is much overlap between space launch technologies and ballistic missile 
technology. With this overlap in mind the Missile Technology Control Regime and the 
Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles (HCOC) have been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ehrenfreund et al. (2010): 246 
39 George and Tyburski (2005) 
40 IFRI Security Studies Center. Johnson-Freese, Joan. “China’s Space Ambitions.” Prepared in 
collaboration with the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), 2007. 26 p.5. 
41 Project 2049. Stokes, Mark A. and Dean Cheng. “China’s Evolving Space Capabilities: Implications for 
U.S. Interests.” Prepared for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012. 84 pp. 
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two international-level attempts to address proliferation. The difficulty in creating an 
effective export control regime is to balance a reduction of trade barriers to encourage 
commercial sector growth while maintaining a due diligence towards national non-
proliferation commitments.42 The most evident example of this barrier are the 
International Trafficking in Arms Regulation (ITAR) export restrictions imposed by the 
US on China. 
 
1.4 Literature review 
Cooperation in space exploration is recognized as necessary; the financial and 
technical resources required to explore space are so great that it is understood that no one 
state can competitively pursue these activities autonomously. Given this 
acknowledgement, existing literature has expressed much interest in investigating 
opportunities for new partnerships and mechanisms for cooperation. The focus of these 
discussions has not concentrated on justifications of why countries should cooperate, but 
rather on how best to implement cooperation- and collaboration-enhancing initiatives.  
The following literature review is divided into four major sections. First, a 
discussion of liberal international relations theory as an appropriate theoretical 
framework to evaluate international cooperation in space exploration will be presented. 
This framework will identify the importance of domestic-level bargaining processes and 
the influence of the international environment in forming national space policy. Second, 
an overview of the evolution of international cooperation in space exploration using the 
Space Exploration 3.0 conceptual framework will be offered. It will be shown that the 
current conditions are unique in that there are many more actors involved in space 
exploration activities and that these activities are being pursued for scientific and non-
scientific reasons. Third, literature regarding desired design criteria for a multilateral 
collaboration mechanism and proposals for international cooperation will be offered. 
These contributions will highlight criteria that must be met for a mechanism to 
successfully facilitate collaboration between spacefaring nations. This section will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Zhao, Yun and Yongmin Bian. “Export control regime for space items in China: Opportunities and 
challenges in the new era.” Space Policy 27 (2011); pp. 107-112. 
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conclude with a critique of the literature and highlight its applicability to the Chinese 
case. 
 
1.4.1 Liberal international relations theory and space activities 
Liberal international relations theory interprets the international system as anarchic. 
The system is comprised of national and transnational actors who interact with each 
other. Cooperation in this environment is possible by using international institutions to 
mitigate behavior. Specifically, the role of international institutions is to encourage good 
governance by promoting liberal values of justice, liberty, and tolerance in international 
relations.43 International regimes also have influence as: “the norms and rules of regimes 
can exert an effect on behavior even if they do not embody common ideals but are used 
by self-interested states and corporations engaging in a process of mutual adjustment”.44 
Liberalism interprets space activities as a complex set of political interactions 
between domestic and international actors. This interpretation therefore considers 
domestic and foreign policy concerns as informing national space policies. This 
perspective is relevant in providing explanations for cooperation as birthed from the 
relationship between national space policies and globalization, which is strongly 
influenced by the high cost of space ventures and required technological 
interdependence.45 
The distinction between harmonization and cooperation within liberal international 
relations theory has particular relevance to space policy. Intergovernmental cooperation 
occurs when “the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its 
partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of 
policy coordination”. 46 An example of intergovernmental cooperation can be seen in the 
function of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN 
COPUOS). UN COPUOS is used to promote good governance between states and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43  Dunne, Tim and Brian Schmidt. “Realism.” The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to 
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44 Keohane, Robert. “Cooperation and International Regimes.” Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving 
Theories of International Relations. Genest, Marc: Oxford University Press, 2003. 199-211. Print 
45 Sheehan (2007): 16 
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involves all participants by instituting a ‘decision by consensus’ rule to encourage 
national delegations to spend time to explain an issue, to communicate background 
information that may not be obvious to emerging spacefaring nations, and to present a 
proposed work plan.47 This process is meant to develop “new norms of behavior in outer 
space, either through internationally accepted guidelines or other forms of codification”.48 
Harmonization refers to a situation where one actor pursues a self-interested policy 
that happens to attain the goals of another actors.49 The ESA provides an example of a 
harmonization of interests. Instead of integrating members within a supranational 
framework the ESA synthesizes overlap between national space policies to harmonize 
national interests into a defined European vision.50 
Although liberalism has explanatory value for cooperation in space activities the 
approach does not capture ideational or cultural influences on national space policy. 
Liberalism’s explanatory value in describing space activities is limited by its focus on 
international and transnational actors. The problem is a consequence of the level-of-
analysis problem in international relations that “permits us to examine international 
relations in the whole, with a comprehensiveness that is of necessity lost when our focus 
is shifted to a lower, and more partial, level”.51  
The value of liberalism as a theoretical grounding for this thesis then is that it 
informs the structure of this paper. Liberalism views national space policy as product of 
complex political bargaining processes that occur domestically as well as the influence of 
the international environment. Acknowledging the dialectic relationship between 
domestic and international factors in influencing national space policy, this work pursues 
research questions that accommodate both levels.  
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50 European Space Agency. “ESA’s Purpose.” Web. Accessed 20 Oct 2013. 
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51 Singer, David J. “The Level-Of-Analysis Problem in International Relations.” Conflict and Cooperation: 
Evolving Theories of International Relations. Genest, Marc: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pg.31. 
 
	   	   22	  
1.4.2 Evolution of cooperation: Space Exploration 3.0 
The history of space exploration has been significantly conditioned by 
geopolitical influences. To capture changes over time Nicolas Peter (2006) presented a 
conceptual model arguing that conditions for cooperation can be grouped into three 
phases (see Table 1). The model is based on the idea that the level of space technology 
achieved by a national space program dictated cooperation. States, according to 
capability from lowest to highest, could be placed on the following scale: 1) purchasing 
of satellites; 2) developing systems in cooperation with a more capable partner; 3) 
developing satellites independently; 4) disseminating satellite technology to others. Using 
this approach cooperation was found to occur between spacefaring countries located on 
the second and fourth position of the proposed development scale. 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Exploration era Characteristics 
Space Exploration 1.0 
Cold War 
• Drivers for cooperation: political, limited to 
‘intra-bloc’ 
• Dominated by two actors: the United States and 
the U.S.S.R. enabled more options for 
cooperation 
Space Exploration 2.0 
1990s-now 
• Drivers for cooperation: scientific and practical 
applications 
• Proliferation of new national space agencies 
Space Exploration 3.0 
Currently transitioning 
towards 
• Drivers for cooperation: quest for knowledge in 
the hard sciences, social sciences, and humanities; 
economic potential 
• Defined by participatory space exploration 
including states, industries, universities, and non-
governmental organizations. 
 
Adapted from Nicolas Peter (2009: 108)  
 
 
The Space Age was birthed primarily from military motivations as competition 
between the United States and the U.S.S.R heighted during the Cold War. During this 
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period space exploration was seen as a venue for peaceful competition between the 
United States and the U.S.S.R.; cooperation was mainly limited to intra-bloc alliances.52  
The post-Cold war era defined the next phase of space exploration. The increase in 
technical capabilities of other states and a proliferation of new national space agencies 
reflected the globalization of space actors. The increase in cooperation between national 
space actors was mainly conducted through bilateral and multilateral agreements, and 
was often driven by scientific motivations.53 It should be noted that cooperation was 
primarily found in space sciences and space applications agreements. During this period 
cooperation in space science often referred to an agreement where one partner agreed to 
launch a foreign instrument or experiment on a national spacecraft. Space applications 
mainly referred to Earth-observation satellites or space-based navigation projects where 
countries lacking the indigenous ability to build and launch these projects could be 
included in this type of partnership by purchasing the services from partners.54  
Cooperation in space sciences and space applications deepened connections 
between states and helped facilitate the internationalization of space activities. Although 
this type of cooperation – in space science and space applications – does not necessarily 
constitute a space exploration activity, it enabled first-time access to space activities for a 
number of states. This engagement in space activities would help build a foundation on 
which nascent national space programs could begin to develop indigenous capabilities. 
The current international context for space exploration differs from previous eras 
as space exploration is becoming more participatory due to a proliferation of actors and 
because it is being driven by scientific and non-scientific motives. Non-scientific motives 
include the quest for knowledge, to discover whether life exists outside of Earth, the 
exploitation of space resources such as asteroid mining, and space tourism to name a 
few.55 In this context, the proliferation of new actors creates new options for cooperation 
that did not exist in state-dominated, bipolar or weak multipolar systems.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Peter, Nicolas. “The changing geopolitics of space activities.” Space Policy 22 (2006): pp. 100-109. 
Pg.108 
53 ibid 
54 ibid, pg.103-104 
55 For further elaboration of non-scientific drivers see European Space Policy Institute. Schrogl, Kai-Uwe. 
“The political context for human space exploration.” Studies in Space Policy: Humans in Outer Space-
Interdisciplinary Perspectives vol. 5 (2011); pp. 3-14; American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
SPACE 2011 Conference & Exposition (2011), Comstock, D. and Lockney, D.; Glass, C.; “A sustainable 
	   	   24	  
 
1.4.3 Building coordination mechanisms 
Space exploration is prohibitively demanding of financial and technical resources 
for any one state to pursue independently in a competitive way. The benefits accrued 
from cooperation are significant ranging from the creation of jobs, scientific gains, and 
spinoff applications to more comprehensive interpretations that capture cultural and 
emotional impacts. What needs to be added to this discussion then is what states want 
from international collaboration in space exploration. In other words, it is important to 
consider criteria a mechanism for multilateral collaboration must meet to encourage 
states to participate. This section will provide an overview of the literature related to the 
building of an international coordination mechanism in space exploration, with a focus on 
state-centered multilateral mechanisms. It will then look at specific proposals for locating 
opportunities for cooperation. 
 
1.4.3.1 Mechanism design criteria 
Multilateral international collaboration mechanisms are used to formalize 
informal communications and can provide the structure needed for more structured 
cooperation. Various design criteria have been proposed in order to construct a 
sustainable mechanism for cooperation that can accommodate the rise of new actors in 
the Space Exploration 3.0 era. 
Correll and Peter (2005) are concerned with creating an enduring exploration 
vision. The authors argue that traditionally space exploration plans have been made at the 
national level and were driven by foreign policy and cost-sharing considerations. One 
problem that arises is that projects in different countries are likely be unaligned in terms 
of funding and schedule thus making cooperation difficult. Furthermore the authors note 
a change in the hierarchy of space powers driven by changes in government and 
industrial space technologies and capabilities. This new context will allow for a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
method for quantifying the benefits of NASA technology transfer” AIAA 2011-7329, Long Beach, 
September 2011. 
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proliferation of international cooperation in space activities since space agencies could 
cooperate a la carte instead of with a ‘set menu’ as in the Cold War.  
The authors argue that the solution for an enduring exploration vision is for it to 
be flexible so as to accommodate changes in priorities of established actors while 
allowing for the inclusion of non-traditional partners. To accomplish this it is 
recommended that metaprinciples and open-system principles be adopted and applied at 
all levels of cooperation – hardware, software, programmatic, political and cultural. 
Metaprinciples relate to the design of enduring exploration architectures that “require 
openness to interaction between the various sectors and participants, such as national 
interests, the scientific community, commercial interests, the general public and the 
private sectors”.56 Open-systems principles refer to architectures and systems that are 
collaborative in nature, have flexible decision-making, and whose objective is to create 
growth in participation and functionality.57 The challenges to adopting an open-systems 
architecture are cost overruns, delays in schedules, and historic legacies manifested in 
entrenched interests.  
Ehrenfreund and Peter (2009) work toward identifying guidelines for designing a 
sustainable global space exploration platform by analyzing the activities and objectives of 
various space exploration programs. A sustainable platform, they argue, should be built 
on stakeholder integration so as to accommodate the growing influence of non-state 
actors as outlined in the Space Exploration 3.0 framework. Stakeholder integration needs 
to occur at intranational and international levels. At the intranational level government, 
industry, the scientific community, and the public as stakeholder must be aligned to as to 
create a strong national base of support for space exploration activities. Building on this 
national-level foundation international stakeholder integration can occur via cooperation 
and global partnerships. Also, for space exploration the main issue will be the availability 
of resources, therefore there is a need to integrate private actors so as to move from a 
technology-push to a market-pull scenario. In this scenario private sector actors could 
provide services and exploit existing government-funded space infrastructure.  
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To facilitate the alignment of main stakeholders the authors apply a SMART58 
analysis to evaluate the strategic planning of global space exploration. It was found that 
to efficiently implement a long-term space exploration strategy requires a better 
definition of SMART and performance objectives. To achieve this stakeholder 
interdependency, the authors suggest a focus on information exchange, organizational 
knowledge, and human capital. It is acknowledged however that a political environment 
capable of providing balanced technology protection and that can establish synergies 
between different strategic national goals is required to pursue long-term missions. 
Schaffer (2008a; 2008b) has researched what design criteria are necessary for a 
desirable multilateral international coordination mechanism for space exploration. The 
author published two papers that utilize synthesized informal interviews with 
representatives from 10 of the Global Exploration Strategy59 participating countries to 
identify desirable criteria for a coordination mechanism. One of the papers grouped the 
perspectives of spacefaring nations and contrasted their required criteria with US criteria 
requirements. It was found that the main overlap between the US and other actors is a 
support for independence, flexibility, and a clear scope. The only area of disagreement 
between the two sides was that the US was concerned over who could participate in the 
mechanism citing foreign policy implications of collaborating with non-preferred 
partners.60  
The second paper builds upon these findings by contrasting required criteria 
synthesized from informal interviews with successful features of existing mechanisms for 
international collaboration. The analysis considered the following existing mechanisms: 
the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, the Group on Earth Observation, the 
International Agency Consultative Group, the International Space Station, the European 
Space Agency, ITER, and the Antarctic Treaty System. It was found that no existing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 SMART analysis is used in project management to evaluate whether goals and objectives have been 
achieved. SMART is an acronym for the following objectives: Specific, Measurable, Acceptable, Realistic, 
and Time-bound.  
59 The Global Exploration Strategy is a vision of a globally coordinated exploration that was jointly 
developed by 14 contributing space agencies and published in 2007. In alphabetical order these agencies 
include: ASI (Italy), BNSC (United Kingdom), CNES (France), CNSA (China), CSA (Canada), CSIRO 
(Australia), DLR (Germany), ESA (European Space Agency), ISRO (India), JAXA (Japan), KARI 
(Republic of Korea), NASA (United States), NSAU (Ukraine), Roscosmos (Russia). 
60 Schaffer, Audrey M. “What do nations want from international collaboration for space exploration?” 
Space Policy 24 (2008); pp. 95-103. Pg. 101-102. 
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mechanism adequately satisfied the requirement criteria of the US and other spacefaring 
nations and therefore recommended establishing a new mechanism. The proposed new 
mechanism builds on the previous work and recommends the inclusion of independence, 
flexibility, and clear scope as key principles. 
 
1.4.3.2 Proposals for international cooperation 
Enhancing international cooperation in the era of Space Exploration 3.0 requires a 
sustainable multilateral international coordination mechanism. The design criteria of such 
a coordination mechanism include metaprinciples, stakeholder integration, and must 
permit independence, flexibility, and provide a clear scope. While these contributions are 
in regards to the design of a coordination mechanism as a platform it is also necessary to 
consider various frameworks used to identify and evaluate opportunities for cooperation 
in space exploration. The following will overview various proposals for international 
cooperation and the parameters that inform them.  
Ansdell et al. (2011) propose a stepping stone approach towards creating a global 
space exploration program. The approach consists of three steps: (1) creating an 
international Earth-based field research program to prepare for planetary exploration, (2) 
increase exploitation of the ISS to use it as a platform for exploration, and (3) a global 
CubeSat61 program that supports exploration activities. The authors organize the space 
community into space powers, emerging space nations, and developing countries. What 
differentiates these categories is where a state places on a continuum of space capabilities 
from high complexity with low dependence on foreign partnerships to low complexity 
with high dependence on foreign partnerships. Achieving ‘established space power’ 
status requires a state to have proven launch vehicles and to have played a significant role 
in exploration missions. This interpretation therefore places technical capability as the 
primary criteria for classifying space capabilities of states. 
For each step a different mechanism for collaboration is recommended with each 
step increasing in level of collaboration, providing emerging space powers and 
developing countries with the opportunity to participate directly in a space exploration 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 CubeSats are a type of nanosatellite with a standard size of 10cm3 and weighs approximately one 
kilogram. 
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project. The proposed collaboration mechanism for the international Earth-based field 
research program in preparation of planetary exploration would be modeled on the 
Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR). SCAR is an in-situ exploration 
model that facilitates regular meetings and information exchanges about various research. 
Data sharing would support collaboration for increasing exploitation of the ISS where 
data generated from an experiment would be used as payment for renting space on the 
ISS.  It is recommended that UN COPUOS and the Committee on Space Research take 
leading roles in organizing this collaboration. Finally collaboration for the global 
CubeSat program would operate on the ‘data sharing in exchange for ridesharing’ model. 
This arrangement would allow partner nations to share data generated from their CubeSat 
as payment for a space launch vehicle-providing partner hosting the payload.  
Broniatowski et al. (2008) contribute a systematic framework to evaluate 
proposals for international cooperation in space exploration. The framework builds on six 
types of international cooperation representing various degrees of collaboration by adding 
technical and policy parameters. The authors argue that previous frameworks have been 
too focused on technical aspects and therefore undervalue the impact of policy factors. 
Technical parameters utilized by this framework are cost, schedule, and performance and 
are considered main determinants of system success. Policy parameters refer to the 
political utility from the perspective of each partner nation and are constructed to capture 
domestic and foreign policy concerns. More specifically, the authors identify the effect of 
national space activities on the domestic economy, national security, national prestige, 
influence on policy at global and regional levels, and on desired technical capabilities as 
key factors in this calculation. Furthermore policy impediments must be considered.  
The authors concede that the list of factors constituting a country’s political utility 
is not exhaustive and cannot apply to each country equally. Instead, policy parameters 
need to be updated at the time of decision-making and be informed by a national 
environment to capture the realities of a given context. 
Szajnfarber et al. (2011) create and evaluate various collaborative space 
exploration architectures62 using NASA, CSA, JAXA, and the ESA in their analysis. The 
goal of their analysis is to identify a sustainable exploration strategy. Collaboration 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 For a definition of ‘collaboration architecture’ see page 31. 
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architectures are based on near-Earth object (NEO) and Moon-first destination scenarios. 
The technical requirement to support each destination and the technological capability of 
the four space agencies inform the technical parameters of the architecture. Political 
parameters for each space agency were derived from various sources including press 
articles, reports, and interviews with key individuals. Using these sources the authors 
established each agency’s priorities and capabilities. 
The main findings of the study were found from overlaying technical and political 
collaboration architectures to determine the feasibility of international cooperation in 
developing the various technical requirements needed to support NEO and Moon-first 
missions. It was found that politically the US needed control of a ‘security core’ 
including crew capsule, launch vehicle and heavy launch vehicle. Given this US 
requirement international contributions were most likely to be in robotic precursor 
missions and planetary access and operations. These potential areas of contribution for 
international partners are therefore susceptible to whether the US chooses a NEO or 
Moon-first approach. For example a NEO destination, such as an asteroid, would not 
require contributions in planetary access and operations, such as a habitation module. In 
this scenario then the potential areas of contribution for international partners is more 
limited. Opportunities for international cooperation with the US is therefore strongly 
influenced by the US’ desired destination. 
Given the relative lack of opportunities for international cooperation for NEO-
first approaches, the authors suggest that a Moon-first approach is more desirable. The 
Moon-first approach is also considered to be more politically palatable since it stirs 
greater interest, scope and prestige. Finally the authors find that a sustainable exploration 
strategy should be destination-driven since it is the politically feasible approach. 
 
1.4.4 Critique of literature 
The above discussion was intended to provide a background on how to facilitate 
international cooperation in space exploration in the current geopolitical environment.  
The goal of this study is to help identify opportunities for international cooperation with 
China in space exploration activities. Building on existing literature this study can now 
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argue that the conditions for cooperation in the Space Exploration 3.0 era are increasingly 
participatory and that national space policy is a product of both domestic bargaining 
processes and influences from the international environment. This insight is relevant for 
this study as it suggests that new configurations of cooperation are available. Specifically, 
it cautions against over-emphasizing state-to-state partnerships instead recommending 
that linkages between new domestic and international actors be considered. The body of 
literature for international cooperation in space exploration however is still relatively 
underdeveloped. For this reason the literature review is more descriptive for the articles 
chosen but limited in breadth.  
The key points relating to mechanism design criteria are that a sustainable 
mechanism requires flexibility to accommodate the interests of a diverse range of actors. 
This requirement is in response to the new Space Exploration 3.0 international 
environment. Contributing authors believe that these recommendations can be achieved 
by applying open-system architectures at various levels, by promoting stakeholder 
integration, and by including principles of independence, flexibility, and a clear scope.  
Much of the literature related to proposals for international cooperation and 
collaboration employ collaboration architectures, a common method used in engineering 
and applied by authors with technical backgrounds. Generally, collaboration architectures 
create matrices that outline the capabilities of partners in relation to various subtasks 
needed to complete a project. These capabilities can be measured in terms of technical 
capabilities or policy considerations and subsequently overlaid to identify potential 
opportunities for cooperation.  
In relation to these discussions two points need elaboration. First, the idea of 
stakeholder integration has particular salience. New actors in space exploration are a 
major driver in the shift to Space Exploration 3.0. As referenced earlier in this work, the 
new era includes states, non-government organizations, universities, and industries; states 
of course remain the central actors.63 Developing a methodology to capture the 
contributions of new actors is not a straightforward task. In regards to national space 
programs, previous methodologies such as aggregate number of satellite launches have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 OECD (2012), “Principal actors in the space economy”, in OECD Handbook on Measuring the Space 
Economy, OECD Publishing.  
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been used to measure national space activities grossly misrepresented national space 
activities.64 Furthermore space activities of developing countries were systemically 
excluded.65  
Due to the increasingly participatory character of space exploration other actors 
such as NGOs are having a measurable effect on space exploration activities. Space 
related NGOs themselves are of diverse makeup and have different roles that mainly 
assist with capacity building. One study surveys the efforts of four prominent space 
related NGOs – the Space Advisory Council, EURISY, The Planetary Society, and the 
Secure World Foundation – and found significant contributions in outreach activities, 
space awareness, dissemination of the benefits of space activities to the general public, 
education campaigns, and capacity building particularly in developing countries.66 
Furthermore NGOs can be used as proxy for diplomacy and communication between 
policymakers making them an effective option for Track Two diplomacy strategies.67 An 
example of this is the work done by the International Astronautical Federation (IAF). The 
IAF’s mission is to “foster dialogue between scientists around the world and support 
international cooperation in all space-related activities”.68 In this pursuit the organization 
has co-organized a number of conferences including the Global Space Exploration 
Conference in 2012 and the IAC, with the 64th IAC having recently taken place in 
September 2013 in Beijing, China. 
To summarize developing countries, space-interest NGOs and private actors are 
contributing to space exploration activities in various ways. The idea of stakeholder 
integration is needed to accommodate the interests and concerns of these actors so as to 
create an environment conducive to participatory space exploration. Including new actors 
in a meaningful way is a key component in creating a sustainable space exploration 
strategy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 European Space Policy Institute. Perek, Lubos. “Cooperation within the UN system.” Studies in Space 
Policy: The Fair and Responsible Use of Space vol. 4, 2010. 101-108. 
65 Wood, Danielle and Annalisa Weigel. “A framework for evaluating national space activity.” Acta 
Astronautica 73 (2012): 221-236. 
66 Lukaszczyk, A. and R. Williamson. “The role of space related non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
in capacity building.” Advances in Space Research 45 (2010): 468-472. 
67 Ibid, p.468. 
68 International Astronautical Federation: About. Accessed April 18th 2013. 
http://www.iafastro.com/index.php/about  
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The second point regarding mechanism design is that to a large extent the 
recommendations have materialized in the form of the International Space Exploration 
Coordination Group (ISECG). ISECG is a non-binding, voluntary international 
coordination mechanism whose purpose is to develop “non-binding findings, 
recommendations and other outputs as necessary for use by Participating Agencies”.69 
ISECG activities are based on four principles: ‘open and inclusive’ ensures that ISECG 
receives inputs from all interested agencies and facilitates consultations among agencies; 
‘flexible and evolutionary’ in that existing coordination mechanisms are considered; 
‘effective’ refers to participating agencies recognizing the benefit of coordination and 
encourages agencies to act upon anticipated results; and ‘mutual interest’ that claims 
ISECG activities to be of benefit to all participants, respect national contexts, and allows 
for optional participation on specific projects.70 In sum, ISECG is a mechanism for 
international collaboration in space exploration that assumes a state-focused and 
consensus-driven approach whose products are non-binding. As such, the value of 
ISECG is in its power to influence the strategic orientations of actors in space 
exploration. The critique of ISECG as a platform for cooperation is that it is state-focused 
and therefore cannot accommodate the plethora of non-state actors.71 
How are Chinese space exploration activities seen in the existing literature on 
international cooperation in space exploration? Interestingly, China is often excluded 
from collaboration architectures despite their status as an ‘emerging space power’ 
stakeholder. The reason for this is due to the fact that the analytical frameworks and 
collaboration architectures are proposed by Western analysts who do not feel qualified to 
assess Chinese capabilities and motivations because of language barriers and limits of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 International Space Exploration Coordination Group. Workplan of the International Space Exploration 
Coordination Group (ISECG). ISECG, 2011. 21 pages. 
http://www.globalspaceexploration.org/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=54c9a954-e112-40a2-9228-
3c1d2d9e6082&groupId=10812  
70 International Space Exploration Coordination Group. Annual Report 2011 of the International Space 
Exploration Coordination Group. ISECG, 2011. 40 pages. Pg.7 
http://www.globalspaceexploration.org/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=757abb46-0e23-4bfc-8c1c-
dde1320faadc&groupId=10812  
71 Ehrenfreund, P. and N. Peter. “Toward a paradigm shift in managing future global space exploration 
endeavors.” Space Policy 25 (2009): 244-256. 
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open, reliable, and accessible information.72 From the author’s reading of existing 
literature information in relation to describing important factors in China’s political 
utility calculation have been scattered, oversimplified, or acknowledged as a limitation as 
left to future work. Some Chinese scholars and a few think-tank reports have attempted to 
improve our understanding on this point, however these contributions have yet to 
meaningfully penetrate literature regarding mechanism design and collaboration 
architectures. 
The China’s Space Activities White Paper indicates that China is positioning itself 
to take advantage of an increasingly participatory space environment. First, China has 
signed 71 bilateral space agreements with various partners and has been actively involved 
in designing, manufacturing, providing in-orbit delivery, and providing ground operations 
training for developing countries’ satellite programs.73Also the utility of NGOs in 
facilitating cooperation in space activities has been recognized by Chinese political 
leaders who have expressed interest in maintaining connections with NGOs as part of 
their multilateral cooperation strategy: “China takes part in activities organized by the 
International Astronautical Federation, International Committee on Space Research, 
ISECG,… and other non-governmental space organizations and academic institutes”.74 
This position is evidenced by China hosting the 2013 IAC in Beijing and is also indicated 
from their desire participate more actively in ISECG in the near future in order to further 
align their space exploration activities with the international community.75 
 There is a gap in the literature in regards to defining China’s space exploration 
ambitions. Analytical frameworks and collaboration architectures used to identify and 
evaluate opportunities for international cooperation in space exploration require that the 
political utility of partner countries be understood and defined. China has expressed 
interest in expanding cooperation emphasizing the need to adequately understand Chinese 
ambitions in space exploration. The contribution of this work will be to better define 
China’s calculation of its political utility. These findings will strengthen existing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 This limitation is explicitly acknowledged by the Szajnfarber et al (2011): pg.5, and implicitly by 
Broniatowski et al (2008): 183. 
73 White Paper. Information Office of the State Council: The People’s Republic of China. China’s Space 
Activities in 2011. 2011, Beijing.  
74 Ibid.  
75 Question submitted by the author at the 64th IAC. The question was answered by the ‘heads of space 
agencies’ plenary session. 
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analytical frameworks and collaboration architectures by providing more reliable 
information about Chinese ambitions in space that can be inputted into these frameworks. 
The end result will be an increased accuracy in identifying opportunities for cooperation 
and collaboration of various space exploration projects.  
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2. China’s civilian space sector 	  
The following section will describe the organizational and industrial infrastructure 
of China’s space industry to gain insight on the main actors driving China’s civilian space 
program. To begin this investigation it is necessary to unpack the ‘black box’ of China’s 
decision-making processes to introduce the positioning of political, government, and 
military actors and how they exert influence on the execution of space exploration 
projects. It will be shown that fragmented authoritarianism and the ‘inside access model’ 
are useful frameworks that provide insight on policy making and policy agenda setting 
respectively for China’s space program. This section will conclude with a discussion on 
China’s position towards international cooperation and the barriers they face as caused by 
domestic trends. Specifically, the role of the PLA and policies promoting civil-military 
integration will be considered.  
 
2.1 Organization 
The following section provides an introduction to the organization and policy-
making processes in China’s space sector. 
2.1.1 Organizational structure 
The space program has a strategic importance and role in attaining national and 
economic security. The importance of the program is reflected by the apex of decision-
making power overseeing space activities that involves China’s most powerful political 
organs including the CCP Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and the 
State Council, to whom the PLA General Armaments Department (PLA GAD) report.76  
China divides its space-related activities into three categories: space technology, 
space science, and space applications.77 Space science and applications identify what 
missions are most desired while space technology is oriented to develop the technology 
needed to support these missions. The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) advises 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Project 2049 Institute, pg. 11 
77 Chinese Academy of Sciences. Space Science & Technology in China: A Roadmap to 2050. Beijing: 
Science Press Beijing, 2010. Print. 
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Chinese political and government leadership on the nation’s science and technology 
(S&T) development and is in charge of organizing China’s space science missions.78 
They have published an important roadmap entitled Space Science & Technology in 
China: A Roadmap to 2050 that provides a detailed account of China’s ambitions in 
space sciences, space applications, and space technologies. An important institute for 
space exploration missions with CAS is the National Space Science Center (NSSC) who 
is responsible “for planning, selecting, developing, launching and managing the operation 
of China’s space science satellite missions”.79 
The implementation of space policy by the space bureaucracy however remains 
difficult to decipher, in part due to the confusion of recent, significant bureaucratic 
restructurings.80 Indeed, as Johnson-Freese notes the organizational complexity still 
proves problematic: “understanding the organizational charts of China’s aerospace and 
policy structures has been and remains an important but often elusive goal for Western 
analysts”.81 From what is known the PLA GAD have significant influence over the 
operations civilian and military space activities. Due to the absence of an empowered 
civilian space organization in China, executive authority for civil and military space 
activities is assigned to the PLA GAD. These responsibilities include coordinating the 
R&D and manufacturing of space systems, and overseeing launch services for both 
commercial and military purposes.82 PLA GAD is also responsible for the manned space 
program and the execution of national and military space acquisition policies.83  
The main civilian space agency is the China National Space Administration 
(CNSA). They are the “governmental organization of the PRC responsible for the 
management of space activities for civilian use and international space cooperation with 
other countries”.84 Their functions include: studying and formulating policies and 
regulation for the space industry; organizing and implementing major space projects and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Ibid, preface. 
79 National Space Science Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences. “A Snapshot of NSSC.” Web. Accessed 
15 October 2013. http://english.nssc.cas.cn/au/ac/  
80Cheng, Dean. “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation.” Space and Defense. Eisenhower Center for 
Space and Defense Studies, US Air Force Academy, Colorado. (Winter 2009): 10.  
81 Johnson-Freese (2009) 
82 Project 2049 Institute, pg. 8 
83 The everyday operation of the manned space program is looked over by the Manned Engineering Office. 
84 China National Space Administration. “China National Space Administration.” Print. 2013. 56 pages. 
	   	   37	  
programs; demonstrating, approving, implementing and supervising civilian space 
scientific research projects; and managing international space cooperation, participating 
in international organizations on behalf of the Chinese government.85 To expand and 
deepen exchanges and cooperation the CNSA has established the inter-agency 
Coordination Committee for International Cooperation (CCIC). The CCIC is responsible 
for making proposals and providing suggesting for future and existing international 
cooperation.86 The chart below summarizes the organization of these actors87: 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 This chart represents a small selection of key players active in China’s civilian space program.  Its 
purpose is to provide a visualization to assist the reader in understanding the key players and their position 
in the hierarchy of actors. Of course there are other key actors such as the Ministry of Science and 
Technology that are excluded from this chart. To the author’s knowledge a comprehensive chart detailing 
the organization of China’s space program has not yet been produced, but would be a valuable contribution 
for future work. 
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The development of space technologies is allocated to two major state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) 
and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC). These two SOEs 
were birthed in 1999 from the split of the China Aerospace Science Technology 
Corporation to create a structure that could facilitate greater market competition to 
provide greater incentives for innovation and efficiency.88 CASC and CASIC perform 
similar activities and are the two most important organizations in China’s space industrial 
infrastructure; both subordinate to the PLA GAD.89 CASC and CASIC have similar 
organizational structures that include a corporate-level structure and oversee various 
academies that are organized into “R&D and/or design departments, research institutes 
focusing on specific sub-systems, sub-assemblies, components, or materials; and then 
testing and manufacturing facilities”.90 As SOEs the enterprises reiterate their adherence 
on their official websites to national interest above all else and conduct space activities to 
serve the goals of the country.91  
CASIC comprises of seven research institutes, two research and production bases, 
six public companies, and more than 600 enterprises and institutions.92,93 It specializes in 
a broad range of defense missile systems in addition to solid carrier rockets and space 
technology products. CASIC’s first academy is notable as it has designed and fielded 
microsatellites.94 CASC is a conglomerate that includes over 125 enterprises who are 
mainly engaged in “the research, design, manufacture and launch of space systems such 
as launch vehicles, satellites and manned spaceships as well as strategic and tactical 
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missiles, and also provides international commercial satellite launch services”.95,96 The 
China Academy of Launch Technology (CASC First Academy) is the largest entity 
involved with developing and manufacturing space launch vehicles and is a leading 
organization in China’s Shenzhou program.97 The Academy of Space Propellant 
Technology (CASC Sixth Academy) is concentrated on research, development, and 
production of liquid fueled propulsion systems and is a key organization in the 
development of the Long March V heavy lift launch vehicle (See appendix A-3).98 CASC 
is also the parent company to the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) who 
are the only commercial organization authorized by the Chinese government to provide 
international clients with commercial satellite launch services and space technology.99  
Subordinate companies in CASC and CASIC have considerable autonomy in 
conducting business operations supporting China’s space program and have even 
established international networks “linking China’s aerospace and missile sector to 
capital, know-how, and technology in the market”.100 Competition between the two SOEs 
is unique in that competition will not be in terms of products but in systems of 
organization and their operational mechanism.101 Subsidiaries of these SOEs do however 
compete for contracts in the international space launch vehicle market that provides 
CASC and CASIC with incentives for efficiency and innovation.102 Each academy 
focuses on a core competency and is accountable for profit and loss.103 
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2.1.2 Policy-making processes 
The process in which policy is made and implemented in China is changing. 
Simply put, one must be careful when blanketing Chinese politics as authoritarian as it 
does not appreciate the significant changes from previous leadership regimes: “the term 
[authoritarianism] is so absurd that it serves more as an ideological curse than as an 
instrument for academic analysis”.104 China’s civilian space program however is not 
easily delineated from its military space operations - projects deliberately cut across both 
divisions.  
 Besha’s (2010) case study of the genesis of the Chang’e lunar orbiter recorded the 
interactions of relevant actors enabling and constraining its development. This case study 
was guided by, and provided support for, two theories: Kenneth Lieberthal’s ‘fragmented 
authoritarianism’ and Shaoguang Wang’s ‘inside-access model’.  
Fragmented authoritarianism is an institutionalist and pluralist framework 
describing the influence of different actors in making policy decisions in the modern 
reform era in China. The framework was proposed by Kenneth Lieberthal asserts that the 
system is ‘fragmented’ in that lines of authority outside of the center are not clear leading 
to an incrementalism in policy making. The system is ‘authoritarian’ as a centralized 
power exerts high degrees of discipline and public policy input from citizens is relatively 
closed.105 Wang suggests a typology of six agenda setting models that are differentiated 
by the degree of public participation and the initiator of an agenda item. Agenda setting 
refers to “the process of prioritizing public issues according to their importance” and can 
be divided into three types: media, public, and policy.106 The latter is most applicable to 
this purview of this paper. The policy agenda type is a “set of issues under serious and 
active consideration by political decision makers at any given time”.107 The inside-access 
model for agenda setting is characterized by a low degree of public participation and has 
advisors as the source initiators of the agenda. 
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In charting the development of the Chang’e lunar orbiter fragmented 
authoritarianism helped explain “the endless sessions of consensus building and 
incrementalism” and “explains the utility and need of leading small groups, which are 
able to coordinate across bureaucratic organs more likely to fight with each other over 
scarce resources.108 The inside access model was valuable in describing agenda-setting 
since China’s space program does not have a clear separation of military and civilian 
space operations, decision-making excludes the input of citizen groups, and space 
exploration is inherently sensitive due to its inextricability with national security issues. 
Although Besha concedes that the findings in the Chang’e lunar orbiter case study may 
not necessarily translate as an explanatory tool for the human spaceflight program, the 
author notes there may be similarities between the two programs as many of the 
leadership personnel is shared. 
The inside-access model and fragmented authoritarianism will serve a useful point 
of departure in unpacking the black box of policy making in China’s space program. 
Specifically these frameworks suggest that coalitions of support and the approval of 
political elites have significant influence over the creation and implementation of Chinese 
national space policy.  
 
2.2 China and international cooperation in space exploration 
The following sections will describe China’s official position towards 
international cooperation and barriers that impede further cooperation. 
 
2.2.1 China’s official position on international cooperation 
China’s official position towards international cooperation in space exploration 
can be found in their White Paper on space activities, the most recent being released in 
December 2011. This document encourages cooperation and states that all international 
exchanges and cooperation should “promote inclusive space development on the basis of 
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equality and mutual benefit, peaceful utilization and common development”.109 
Furthermore the White Paper expresses that international cooperation should adhere to 
the ‘UN Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the 
Needs of Developing Countries’. 
This pro-cooperation position can been seen in remarks made by Wang Zhaoyao, 
Director of the China Manned Space Agency, at the 64th International Astronautical 
Congress: 
 
“It has been China’s consistent pursuit to carry out international 
cooperation and exchange on the principle of equality and mutual 
benefit, mutual respect and transparency. China has collaborated 
extensively with many other countries and regions in space technology, 
space medicine research, space science experiments and astronaut 
selection and training. In the construction and operating phase of our 
space station, we will seek for international cooperate on in an even 
more open manner and [are] willing to share space development 
accomplishments with other countries, especially developing 
countries.”110 
 
The key points regarding China’s foreign policy stance are mutual respect and equality. 
This is found in all of China’s White Papers on its space activities and is seen as 
necessary to support cooperation.111 
In regards to China’s accomplishments in international cooperation the document 
notes a number of bilateral agreements and participation in various multilateral 
coordination mechanisms. Key areas for future cooperation in the next five years are also 
presented and include scientific research on space astronomy, space physics, micro-
gravity science, space life sciences, and deep-space exploration among others. 
Technological cooperation is also highlighted, specifically for projects in China’s human 
spaceflight program and space science research and experiments.  	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2.2.2 Barriers to international cooperation for China 
Chinese national space policy documents indicate that it is open for international 
cooperation in various space explorations activities. There are however domestic factors 
that impede China’s ability to expand these partnerships. Two of these factors are the role 
of the PLA in China’s space activities and a policy encouraging CMI of technologies. 
The role of the PLA has consequences in communications and ideology; CMI has 
consequences for dual-use technologies and unwanted technology transfer.  
The blurring between military and civilian space activities in China has created a 
lack of transparency. From what is known about the organizational structure the PLA has 
amassed significant clout over many of the main administrative and industrial actors in 
China’s space sector.112 The interpretation of China’s space ambitions has been to assume 
a significant military dimension to China’s civilian space activities. 
It is important to consider that distorted information regarding Chinese ambitions 
in space stemming from ineffective communication are not necessarily deliberate i.e. 
misunderstandings do not originate from a lack of transparency. Much 
miscommunication has occurred due to the difficulty for Western analysts to monitor and 
understand space-related organizational changes in China and to find reliable and well-
translated Chinese sources.113 The consequence of this misunderstanding has led to 
confrontational interpretations that emphasize and exaggerate Chinese civilian space 
activities as only being part of a grand military space strategy,114 although this view has 
provoked criticism.115 
The role of the PLA has also fuelled ideological differences that act as a major 
barrier to cooperation in the Sino-US case. Sino-US bilateral cooperation in space is 
effectively stalled as a consequence of section 1340(a) of NASA’s budget that prohibits 
NASA to spend funds “to enter into a contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or 
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coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company”.116 The 
law was put forth by Congressman Frank Wolf and has clear ideological undertones:  
 
“I want to be clear: the United States has no business cooperating with 
the People’ Liberation Army to help develop its space program. We also 
should be wary of any agreements that involve the transfer of technology 
or sensitive information to Chinese institutions or companies, many of 
which are controlled by the government and the PLA…there will come a 
day when the Chinese communist government will fall, repressive, 
totalitarian regimes always do. And when that day comes, books will be 
written about who helped sustain this government in their final days. Will 
U.S. companies feature in that narrative? Will the U.S. government?”117 
 
It should be noted that this legal barrier does not prohibit Sino-US cooperation through 
multilateral mechanisms, as was clarified by the recent admission of Chinese scientists to 
a conference for US and international teams working on NASA’s Kepler space telescope 
program.118 
A controversial policy guiding Chinese civilian space activities is the concept of 
CMI. CMI is an effort to leverage investments made in the civilian sector by finding an 
application for military potential. This principle was proposed by the Sixteenth Party 
Congress in 2003 and is known as Yujun Yumin (Locating Military Potential in Civilian 
Capabilities). As a result Western companies who cooperate with China understand that 
transfer of capital and technology may be used to exploit dual-use applications.119 The 
CMI policy is well advertised as major actors within the organizational and industrial 
infrastructure including the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), 
CASC, and CASIC all cite CMI as key components of their respective mandates on their 
organizational websites. 
Military application of dual-use technologies has created concern from the 
international community towards China in part due to the secrecy that shrouds Chinese 	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space activities.120 Dual-use technologies themselves however are not necessarily a 
concern; indeed most space actors see dual-use as desirable is it as it avoids duplication 
and increases to rate of return on investments.121 Due to the fact that space exploration 
operates on the frontiers of science and technology there is an intrinsic acknowledgement 
that advances made in pursuit of these projects will likely embody potential for 
alternative use. One of the most often cited benefits of space exploration activities are 
spinoffs applications. Problems arise when the actions of other actors are assumed to be 
malicious, as Johnson-Freese notes: “the U.S. assumption is that if dual use technology is 
being developed in China, it is for military purposes. While that assumption clearly 
overreaches, China is developing space technology for military as well as civilian 
purposes”.122  
As was discussed in the introduction to this paper the challenge of unwanted 
technology transfer is addressed through export control regimes. An effective export 
control regime strikes a balance between a due diligence to non-proliferation efforts 
while reducing trade barriers to encourage growth of the commercial sector. In regards to 
China’s export control regime two major space powers – the US and the EU – have taken 
a cautious approach with China, albeit for similar yet different reasons. First it has been 
argued that the main problems of China’s export control regime are the lack of 
transparency of China’s space ambitions and poor technology safeguards.123 Furthermore 
there has been criticism that China has not been proactive in participating in international 
non-proliferation regimes nor have they subscribed to an international code of conduct.124  
The US posture towards China is informed by the Cox Commission Report in 
October 1998 that concluded US satellite manufactures violated US export control 
regulations by providing data and helping Chinese scientists resolve technical issues, 
despite the findings of this report having been questioned.125 In response the US imposed 
an ITAR export license ban that prohibits the export or re-export of satellites with US 	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technology to China.126 From the perspective of the EU the main challenges to 
collaboration with China are a lack of intellectual property rights protection and the 
potential of an undesired application of dual-use technology.127 To resolve these issues a 
reformed export control system is recommended to allow Europe to benefit from China’s 
rise while not alienating their relations with the US.  
In response to these challenges China has been working towards ameliorating 
their domestic export control regime. Underlying the concerns noted above is that China 
does have a sophisticated legal framework supporting a domestic export control regime, 
however effective and efficient enforcement remain a challenge. 128 A second area 
needing progress is the level of Chinese participation in major multilateral 
nonproliferation export control regimes. It is important to consider however that although 
China is not a member of many international non-proliferation regimes it has employed 
similar policies to control arms exports, including space items and missiles. Also the 
reluctance to adhere to the HCOC is due to the various security-related restraints that 
would impede China’s growth.129 Nevertheless greater participation with international 
efforts seems beneficial.  
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3. Case studies  	  
The rise of new actors participating in space exploration missions and the increase 
in motivations to explore space are changing conditions for cooperation in the space 
environment. In response to these new conditions spacefaring countries have expressed a 
preference for flexible, non-binding mechanisms to coordinate multilateral cooperation. 
A key variable in identifying opportunities for cooperation are policy parameters that 
encompass domestic and foreign policy considerations. Although there can be overlap in 
policy parameters between countries these parameters must be adjusted to accurately 
capture a particular country’s goals from its space exploration activities. This section 
seeks to define China’s policy parameters by answering the question: What does China 
want from its civilian space exploration program? This section will dissect China’s 
national space policy for space exploration by elaborating on the domestic and foreign 
policy considerations informing their position on two major domestic space programs and 
three international space projects. This elaboration will enable a deeper understanding of 
the calculation of political utility China attributes to its space exploration activities.  
 
3.1 Summary of analysis 
The goal of this analysis is to understand China’s calculation of political utility 
from its space exploration activities. As identified by existing literature the policy 
parameters influencing this calculation come from domestic and foreign policy 
considerations. To capture these considerations two research questions will be used to 
structure the analysis: 
 
1. What domestic policy considerations influence how China sets its space 
exploration goals? 
2. How does the international environment enable and constrain opportunities for 
international cooperation in space exploration available to China? 
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The first research question has the goal of defining China’s space exploration 
ambitions as driven by domestic interests. The case studies chosen for this analysis are 
the two major space exploration programs in China: Project 921 and the Lunar 
Exploration Program. To answer the research question two guiding questions related to 
motivation and integration will be used. Motivation will answer why China decided to 
pursue the program and to identify the main actors involved. Integration will briefly 
identify how the space program is integrated with other government S&T policies or 
initiatives. This consideration is important, as it will providence evidence for to what 
degree S&T development should be emphasized as a policy parameter in China.  
The second research question has the goal of describing foreign policy 
considerations by analyzing three cooperative space projects. The space project case 
studies were selected to include cases where China experienced project success and 
failure, and a project that has had international success but in which China has been 
excluded. Respectively, these three space projects include: Yinghuo-1 (Mars space 
probe), Kuafu (space weather satellites), and the ISS (space laboratory). These cases have 
been cited in various presentations given by authoritative figures from CAS regarding the 
current status of Chinese space science and space technology programs and international 
cooperation, signifying their importance.130 Each case will be analyzed systematically by 
looking at mission objectives, responsibilities assigned to contributing partners and the 
barriers encountered. Investigating these cases will highlight barriers China faced in these 
projects, illustrating the constraints imposed by the international environment as well as 
the degree of international collaboration achieved.  
 The analysis will utilize two contributions from the Broniatowski et al. (2008) 
study. First, policy parameters will be represented by five categories: national prestige, 
national security, economic development, S&T goals, and influence at regional and 
global levels. These categories are not mutually exclusive or necessarily applicable in 
every case. Nevertheless they are considered to capture the most important policy 
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considerations and will be used to analyze the space program case studies.131 Second, to 
give context to the degree of cooperation achieved in the selected space projects the ‘six 
types of international cooperation’ will be employed. This will help address the degree to 
which the international environment enables and constrains opportunities for cooperation 
for China. 
Together the selected space programs and space projects will illustrate main 
policy parameters in China’s domestic (space programs) and foreign (space projects) 
space exploration missions. The selection of programs and projects is also useful in that 
projects are not as encompassing as programs, and can therefore capture incremental 
opportunities for cooperation. This specificity allows the analysis to more accurately 
measure the degree of international cooperation achieved by China.  
 
 
3.2 RQ1: What domestic policy considerations influence how 
China sets its space exploration goals? 
 
3.2.1 Project 921 
China’s human spaceflight program was put on China’s agenda as a result of Plan 
863, an outline submitted by four prominent Chinese scientists who identified seven 
‘breakthrough’ areas in which China could catch up with other international leaders.132 
From the initial proposal in March 1986, the Shenzhou and Tiangong programs were 
eventually created in 1992 with the approval of Project 921 - the human spaceflight 
program. The program included the development of a spaceship (Shenzhou or Project 
921-1) and a multi-modular space station (Tiangong or Project 921-2) (See appendix A-4 
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and A-5). The program continues to be overseen by the China Manned Space 
Engineering Office.133 
The Shenzhou program’s mandate was to develop a spacecraft capable of 
transporting taikonauts and various science experiments into space.134 There have been 
ten Shenzhou spacecraft mission launches since November 1999, with the Shenzhou-5 
mission on October 15, 2003 being a significant achievement as China became the third 
country to independently launch a person into space.135 Shenzhou-7 (September 2008) 
and Shenzhou-9 (June 2012) missions were also major accomplishments as the former 
conducted China’s first extravehicular space activity and the latter successfully 
performed a manual docking with the Tiangong-1.136 The most recent mission, 
Shenzhou-10, had a crew of three taikonauts who carried out various scientific 
experiments, and conducted an automated and manual docking.137 During this mission a 
very popular ‘space lecture’ was given by Wang Yaping, China’s second female 
astronaut, and broadcasted to over 60 million students and teachers across China.138 The 
completion of the Shenzhou-10 mission marked the end of the Shenzhou program.  
The Tiangong program is a three-part program with the goal of building a 
modular space station by 2020. The state-level space laboratory will be capable of 
hosting astronauts long-term, will be used as a platform for space science experiments, 
and will be open to international partners. The Tiangong-1 space laboratory module was 
successfully launched in September 2011. It has a primary function of facilitating 
docking tests and space rendezvous that will provide the foundation for the building of 
subsequent space laboratories and space stations.139 Tiangong-2 and Tiangong-3 space 
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laboratories have expected launch dates in 2015 and 2018 respectively.140 Once 
connected the three Tiangong modules will complete China’s multi-module space station. 
Exact motivations used in the duration of the Shenzhou program are not explicit 
and has provoked various explanations.141 Western scholars tend to emphasize the 
symbolic significance of human spaceflight. For example human spaceflight as a ‘status 
marker’ is considered as an admission ticket to being a super power and is therefore the 
most significant motivation for human spaceflight for China’s political elite.142 
Supporting this view is the observation that the national prestige associated with 
accomplishments from Project 921 has been primarily advertised domestically in contrast 
to other countries who tend to prefer international exposure.143 It is important to note 
however that the link between national prestige and human spaceflight is not uncommon. 
Indeed the motivation for sustaining a human spaceflight program is often attributed to 
being prestige-driven due to the high costs of human missions relative to robotic 
missions, although analysts seem to see this as particularly true in the Chinese case. 
Chinese authors in contrast take a more comprehensive view, arguing that the Project 921 
must be understood in the context of China’s national development strategy where space 
technology plays a key role in China’s economic development.144 This view has also been 
broadened to include other national strategic goals including social improvement and 
progress in S&T.145 These positions have tended to cite economic benefits gained from 
China’s commercial space sector and spinoffs in space applications technologies as 
evidence for emphasizing economic development. Finally the scientific community and 
representatives from academies developing the requisite space technologies for Project 
921 see the main reasons for China’s human spaceflight program as: to explore outer 
space peacefully with the international community for the benefit of all mankind; to 
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promote ‘leap-frog’ progress in scientific and technological innovation; impetus for 
national economic development; realize the Chinese dream of flying into space.146  
The human spaceflight program is strongly integrated with China’s 
comprehensive national S&T development plan that focuses on national security and 
long-range economic competitiveness. Space was identified as a strategic technology 
field in Plan 863 and is seen a key driver to achieve national development goals. Ongoing 
support for the human spaceflight program can be seen in its identification as an 
engineering megaproject in the Medium- to Long-Term Plan for the Development of 
Science and Technology 2005-2020 (MLP).  
 
3.2.2 Lunar Exploration Program 
China’s Lunar Exploration Program (Chang’e program) is part of their deep 
space exploration strategy. The program was approved in 2004 and is supervised by State 
Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense’s Lunar 
Exploration Engineering Center and the CAS Lunar Exploration Engineering 
Department.147 In total more than 200 universities, laboratories, and research institutes 
have contributed to the development of Chang’e in addition to CAS, CASIC, CASC, and 
their affiliates.148 The idea of establishing a lunar exploration program originated with 
Ouyang Ziyuan who held a leadership position in the Institute for Geochemistry in CAS. 
As an expert in lunar geology Ziyuan was able to create an advocacy group of prominent 
Chinese scientists to advance the idea of Chinese lunar exploration mission. After 
submitting a number of feasibility studies to China’s political leadership, benefiting from 
organizational changes that gave more power to scientists within the advocacy group, a 
three-phase, five-mission long-term lunar exploration program was approved by the Party 
Central Committee under Premier Wen Jiabao in January 2004 (See appendix A-6).149 
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The program is organized into three stages: orbiting, landing, and sample-
return.150 Chang’e-1 was launched in October 2007 and achieved its scientific objectives 
of obtaining a three-dimensional stereo image of the lunar surface, studying the 
distribution of useful elements, surveying thickness of lunar soil, and exploring the 
environment between the Moon and the Earth.  Chang’e-2 launched in October 2011 and, 
inter alia, created a full high-resolution map of the moon, circled the Lagrangian Point 
L2, and continues to gather data to lay the foundation for future deep-space exploration 
missions.151 Chang’e-3 (2013) and Chang’e-4 (2015) missions constitute the second stage 
of the lunar exploration program and will perform a lunar soft landing with two rovers to 
survey the lunar surface.152 The Chang’e-5 (2015-2020) mission will send small robotic 
vehicles to the lunar surface to conduct a sample-return mission.153  
A number of motivations for the lunar exploration program have been proposed. 
An in-depth case study of policy-making in the Chang’e program found that the original 
argument made by Ouyang Ziyuan was to launch a rocket to the moon in 1997 to 
coincide with the hand over of Hong Kong to China; linking these two events would 
provide a significant contribution to garner national prestige.154 This justification 
however was rejected numerous times by China’s political and military elite, as 
subsequent feasibility studies were needed to demonstrate the scientific value of a lunar 
exploration program.155 Other analyses find that the Chang’e program’s main purpose is 
for China to demonstrate technological advancement. This advancement is fuelled by 
indigenous innovation, a key aspect to China’s S&T development strategy, and enables 
national prestige to be built by advertising the program’s successes.156  
Similar to Project 921 the lunar exploration program is also deeply integrated with 
China’s S&T development goals. The Chang’e program is coupled with human 
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spaceflight as an engineering mega-project in the MLP and therefore has access to 
additional financial resources and higher quality human capital.157 
 
3.2.3 Discussion 
The analysis for the first research question looks at the motivation for each 
program and their integration with other government S&T development initiatives. The 
analysis of these space programs is believed to provide meaningful insight on China’s 
domestic policy considerations that influence Chinese national space exploration-related 
policies.  
It was found that there is no consensus on a specific motivation driving China’s 
human spaceflight program. Instead a set of motivations were suggested related to 
China’s national development plan, specifically in areas of economic development, social 
progress, and technological capability. Western analysts tended to emphasize the soft 
power gained from a human spaceflight program supporting a view of national prestige 
and status as key motivators. In regards to the Lunar Exploration Program the 
motivations were found to be primarily science-driven. This is reflected in the numerous 
feasibility studies and advocacy coalitions needed to convince political leadership to 
support the program. The motivations for the lunar exploration program are most likely 
less debated than those for Project 921 due to the fact that the program thus far has been a 
series of robotic missions. As such the intangible effects of a human mission are not as 
potent. 
The most significant integration of these space programs is with China’s national 
S&T and economic development strategy. Both programs are included as engineering 
megaprojects in the MLP and have been opportunities to facilitate indigenous innovation. 
To appreciate the implications of their inclusion as megaprojects it is necessary to 
understand the function of the MLP in China. 
The MLP has significant influence in guiding the development of China’s 
national science plans. It proposes new national R&D projects, introduces new 	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‘megaprojects’, and provides policies to guide their implementation.158  The most recent 
rendition, introduced in January 2006, was drafted over two years with input from over 
2000 members in technical communities and corporate executives.159 The MLP was 
created to address a number of critical problems in China’s scientific and technological 
development including: a weak record in of innovation in commercial technologies; the 
failure of technological capabilities to address key national needs in energy, resource 
utilization, and public health; lack of defense-related technological innovation; poor 
results in keeping talented Chinese scientists to career opportunities abroad.160  
In pursuit of these goals the MLP introduces 12 national megaprojects161 that will 
“integrate government guidance with markets, promote innovation and input patterns 
with industries as principle entities, and realize the integration of industry-university-
research institutes”.162  This approach reflects China’s desire to further locate R&D in 
industrial enterprises in the national innovation system. Megaprojects employ 
Megaproject Leading Small Groups for direction and are coordinated through an inter-
agency process including the Ministry of Science and Technology, the National 
Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the MIIT, and the 
Ministries of Agriculture and Public Health.163 Funding schemes for megaprojects go 
beyond resources provided by the central government to include funds from local 
governments, financial institutions and enterprises, and have preferential access to the 
best human capital.164 
The idea of indigenous innovation (zizhu chuangxin) was first introduced during 
the preparation of the MLP document in 2003 in response to a desire to shift from cheap 
export driven economic growth to diversified sources of GDP expansion and secondly to 
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secure supply chains for advanced technologies.165 It is best understood as “a series of 
investments and industrial policies designed to enhance the role of innovation in the 
PRC’s economic growth”.166 The drive for indigenous innovation is considered a key 
contributor to upgrade China’s industrial structure and has been emphasized in the Ninth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Five-Year Plans.167 
Some empirical evidence showcases examples of the extent to which indigenous 
innovation played a role in these programs. First, although visual similarities between 
Shenzhou and the Russian Soyuz suggested a heavy Chinese reliance on foreign technical 
assistance, subsequent analyses found that autonomous propulsion and flight, solar power 
and control systems were specific to the Shenzhou design. These specifications were 
needed to allow Shenzhou to facilitate other human spaceflight techniques needed to 
complete its missions including extravehicular activity, rendezvous and docking.168 The 
Chang’e program was able to attract a number of highly skilled S&T personnel by 
providing projects at the frontiers of basic and applied science research and whose 
contributors gain societal respect.169 The sustainability of the drive for indigenous 
innovation seems promising, as 80% of the workforce involved with Project 921 are and 
leading scientists and engineers involved with Chang’e are under forty years old.170171 
Project 921 and the Lunar Exploration Program case studies demonstrate that both 
programs are central to China’s economic and S&T development goals. Their 
identification as mega-engineering projects and as platforms for indigenous innovation 
support this position. It can therefore be said that China’s space exploration programs 
have a pragmatic dimension as they are seen as proxies on upgrading the domestic 
economy and enhancing technological capability. As such the two related policy 
parameters gaining weight would be economic development and S&T development.  
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3.3 RQ2: How does the international environment enable and 
constrain opportunities for international cooperation in space 
exploration available to China? 
 
3.3.1 Kuafu 
The Kuafu project is a multi-spacecraft mission that is part of a larger effort to 
study space weather. It consists of two missions – Kuafu A and Kuafu B – whose 
operations will support the Meridian program, a China-led international ground-based 
space environment-monitoring network, and builds on the Double Star program, a 
successful collaboration between the ESA and China to study the Earth’s 
magnetosphere.172 Specifically, the project will consist of three satellites with the first, 
Kuafu-A, having an expected launch date in 2017.173 
The Kuafu project was proposed in 2003 at the Space Weather Group meeting of 
the National Natural Science Foundation of China as a mission capable of providing for 
China’s space science, space technology, and space weather application goals.174 Due to 
is wide impact it is also included the NSSC Strategic Pioneer Program on Space 
Science175 – approved space science missions dedicated to understanding the universe 
and Earth and to seek new discoveries and breakthroughs.176 Cooperation for the project 
is organized through the Kuafu Coordination and Planning Committee.177 The committee 
is authorized by the CNSA and represents Peking University, CAS, CASC, and the 
Chinese Meteorological Administration.  
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International cooperation has been a central feature in the early phases of the 
Kuafu project, as is evidenced by the pre-engineering assessment study phase where 
partners from 11 countries were involved in the collaboration.178 This study phase 
provided a basis for how responsibilities would be assigned to different partners. The 
Kuafu-A satellite will be located at the L1 Lagrangian point and will continuously 
monitor the Sun, specifically scanning for Coronal Mass Ejections and measuring the 
Interplanetary Magnetic Field.179 It will include a number of in-situ and remote 
observation instruments where six are to be contributed by CAS, two are open to 
European interest, and one with potential interest from Switzerland.180 Operations will be 
shared, however the majority of the responsibility will be handled by Europe due to the 
lack of adequate antenna infrastructure for real-time operations available in China.  
The Kuafu-B missions include two identical satellites to be delivered using the 
Long March 3B launch vehicle into the Molniya orbit to monitor the Earth’s 
magnetosphere in the polar regions. A feasibility study to assess technical requirements 
and costs done by the ESA confirmed that European small satellite platforms were 
sufficient, although modifications would need to be made to ensure interoperability and 
to adhere to ITAR restrictions.181 However, the program proposal submitted by the ESA 
for participation in Kuafu-B was not approved at the ESA Council of Ministers Meeting 
in November 2012.  
A major impediment to the project occurred from the 2012 ESA Council of 
Ministers Meeting that did not approve ESA participation in Kuafu-B. The reasons for 
non-approval remain unclear. One possible explanation suggests that the mission required 
participation from the ESA’s Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Programme and the 
Science Programme, where the SSA Programme declined participation.182 Another 	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possible explanation could be on financial restrictions thereby leading to the ESA’s 
withdraw from the project.183  
 
3.3.2 Yinghuo-1 
Yinghuo-1 (YH-1), or the Martian Space Environmental Exploration Orbiter, was 
a Chinese-built microsatellite hosted on the Russian Phobos-Grunt sample return 
spacecraft to investigate the Martian space environment and the solar wind-planet 
interaction.184 Specifically, a series of scientific explorations would fulfill mission 
objectives of studying the Martian magnetic field, particle variation and distribution, 
ionosphere, gravity field, and various topographical investigations.185 The scientific 
motivation for undertaking the mission was to help China improve its accuracies in deep-
space telemetry and telecontrol, orbit determination and injection, increase engineering 
capacity to build space probes, and to promote planetary exploration and basic physics 
research.186 Among the many scientific gains to be accrued from the mission the main 
benefit will be to provide China’s space agency with experience flying and operating a 
spacecraft in deep space. Launching on November 8th 2011, the YH-1 was to be China’s 
inaugural spacecraft in their Mars exploration program, however an engine malfunction 
with the Phobos-Grunt probe left the spacecraft stranded in Earth orbit.187   
The NSSC initiated the YH-1 project, managed cooperation with Russia and was 
the leading institute for scientific application systems and payload development. Design 
and development of YH-1 microsatellite payload were delegated to the Shanghai 
Academy of Spaceflight Technology for design and the Shanghai Satellite Engineering 
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Institute for assembly.188 Under the framework of China-Russia cooperation in space 
science the YH-1 Phobos-Grunt joint mission was birthed in March 2007 with the signing 
of a cooperation agreement on the joint exploration of Mars. Specifically, the project was 
a piggyback mission where the YH-1 microsatellite would be delivered to its destination 
by Russia’s Phobos-Grunt probe. Upon entering the Martian gravitational field YH-1 
would detach from Phobos-Grunt and enter into an elliptical orbit around Mars to start its 
yearlong mission.189 Under the agreement Russia would provide YH-1 with tracking and 
communications support for the duration of its mission.190 
There were no significant barriers to cooperation in this project. One 
consideration however was a delay in the launch date from October 2009 to November 
2011 due to the need to improve the Phobos-Grunt probe. During this time some parts in 
the YH-1 probe needed to be replaced while being stored in China.191 
 
3.3.3 International Space Station 
The International Space Station (ISS) is a space laboratory with a permanent 
human presence located in low Earth orbit. The program is considered to be a remarkable 
technological and human achievement and is the most politically complex space 
exploration program ever undertaken.192 The program was recently extended to continue 
operations until 2020. 
The ISS has a modular structure whose various components have been delivered 
and installed over the course of its 25-year construction period.193 The ISS serves a 
spectrum of purposes due to the fact that its microgravity and space environment 
laboratory is unique, allowing for innovative experiments in many fields including 
biology, physics, material science, Earth and space science, and a number of related 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 For an elaboration of the technical specifications of YH-1 see Chen et al (2010) “The Key Techniques 
and Design Features of YH-1 Mars Probe.” Chinese Astronomy and Astrophysics 34 (2010) 217-226. 
189 Wu Ji et al. (2010) “Scientific Objectives of China-Russia Joint Mars Exploration Program YH-1.” 
Chinese Astronomy and Astrophysics 34 (2010): 165. 
190 “Yinghuo 1.” Dragon In Space: China’s Space Programme, Past and Present. 19 January 2013. Web. 
Accessed 1 October 2013. http://www.dragoninspace.com/planetary/yinghuo1.aspx  
191 ibid. 
192 National Aeronautics Space Administration. “International Space Station: International Cooperation.” 
NASA. Web. Accessed April 14th 2013. 
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/cooperation/index.html#.UnbPvZQpbtc 
193 Encyclopedia Astronautica. “ISS.” http://www.astronautix.com/project/iss.htm  
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fields. Furthermore the ISS is a platform for testing spaceflight systems and docking 
procedures.194 In regards to space exploration the ISS hosts experiments in basic and 
applied scientific research that provide supporting knowledge for future exploration 
missions and can be used as a platform for testing space technologies.  
The ISS is a significant collaboration between 16 countries including five 
principle space agencies and is established on intergovernmental treaties and agreements; 
China is not included in this collaboration.195 Contributions from different partners are 
developed jointly or independently and are assembled (if needed) and mated with the ISS 
in orbit. The partner who contributes a piece of infrastructure has jurisdiction over that 
contribution. As a consequence operations on the ISS are complex as each partner has the 
responsibility to maintain the hardware it provides. Furthermore a number of facilities for 
mission operations support, communication, construction, and launch and processing are 
needed to provide support services for the assembly and operations of the ISS. These 
facilities are dispersed across all partner countries. 
Due to the number of contributing partners the ISS program has encountered 
numerous general impediments to international cooperation. Most notable have been cost 
overruns and the construction-to-service timespan that lengthens the return-on-investment 
period.196 These concerns have led to issues with the political sustainability of the project 
as partner countries have had difficulty justifying the expense domestically. For China, 
the impediment to participation has been the US. The US holds veto power over the 
acceptance of new partners and has rejected China’s inclusion on the basis of an 
insufficient technology capability in space technologies.197 
 
3.3.4 Discussion 
The analysis for the second research question has the goal of identifying foreign 
policy considerations through the influence of the international environment on China’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 ibid. 
195 The principle space agencies include the United States, Russia, Europe, Japan and Canada. 
196 Encyclopedia Astronautica, http://www.astronautix.com/project/iss.htm 
197 “China wants role in space station.” CNN: Technology. 16 October 2007. Web. Accessed 20 October 
2013. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080314104006/http://www.cnn.com/2007/TECH/space/10/16/china.space.ap/
index.html  
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space exploration activities. This influence will be measured by looking at mission 
objectives, the responsibilities assigned to each partner and barriers faced in three 
cooperative space exploration projects. Specifically, the former two points will showcase 
the degree to which the international environment has enabled opportunities for 
cooperation whereas the latter will identify whether the impediments encountered were 
general or China-specific in nature.  
The degree to which the international environment has enabled opportunities for 
cooperation for China can be see in the mission objectives and assigned responsibilities 
for each space project. The early phases and proposed roles for international partners for 
the Kuafu A and Kuafu B missions indicate a high level of cooperation. The preliminary 
assessment study report was prepared from contributions from 11 different countries as a 
pre-engineering study project to be presented to international team members to solicit 
support from their respective funding agencies.198 Furthermore other national projects, 
such as the Canadian Ravens project, merged with Kuafu.199 Although the Kuafu-B 
missions were not approved, the ESA Kuafu Program Proposal provides a detailed 
account of assigned responsibilities for Kuafu-A. China will contribute the launch vehicle 
and the majority of science experiment payloads to the Kuafu project. These constitute 
niche and critical path contributions to the projects, ranking the level of international 
cooperation at 3 (medium-high). Although the number of participant involved in the 
project signify a high level of collaboration, from China’s perspective the level of 
cooperation is capped at 3 as the two higher rankings require the project to be 
spearheaded by a foreign partner (4) and to contribute resources to a multinational 
organization (5).  
The YH-1 Photo-Grunt joint mission was a collaboration between China and 
Russia where Russia provided China with piggyback services. There was no joint 
development of space technology as the YH-1 microsatellite was produced indigenously 
by China. Since the mission was led by a foreign partner (from the Chinese perspective) 
for mutual benefit the project is ranked with a cooperation level of 4 as a parallel mission.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Chuan-Yi Tu, Rainer Schwenn, Eric Donovan, Jing-Song Wang, Li-Dong Xia, and Yong-Wei Zhang. 
“Kuafu Project: International Collaboration.” Kuafu Study Team. 2006. Available at: 
http://ilwsonline.org/china_kuafu.pdf  
199 ibid. 
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The ISS program is supported by the contributions of partner members. The 
construction of the ISS required high levels of interoperability across system and in its 
totality is used as a in-situ space laboratory. Although led by the five principle space 
agencies, most notably the US, the scientific and technological advances gained by 
experiments performed on the ISS are of mutual benefit for contributing partners. The 
program falls short of having participants contribute to a space organization who the sets 
priorities and assigns responsibility, and therefore is ranked at a level 4 cooperation as a 
parallel mission. However due to China’s exclusion, the cooperation is of course ranked 
at 0.  
The impediments faced in these space projects show how the international 
environment constrains China’s opportunities for cooperation. Each of the three cases 
exemplifies a different situation. First, the YH-1 did not experience any major problems. 
This is likely due to piggyback mission design that did not require any significant amount 
of collaboration. In regards to the Kuafu project the ESA Council of Ministers did not 
approve the Kuafu B mission, possibly due to the unwillingness of the ESA’s SSA 
Programme to participate or due to financial restrictions. These explanations relate to the 
general barriers to international cooperation, specifically to the unaligned programmatic 
and funding cycles practical impediments. This finding reveals that cooperation on this 
project did not create sufficient levels of political sustainability and diplomatic utility for 
the ESA to continue the mission. 
 The most serious barrier was found in the ISS case. China has voiced its desire 
on numerous occasions to participate in the ISS and have gone so far as to design their 
own space station – Tiangong – to be interoperable with existing ISS infrastructure.200 
Nevertheless China’s exclusion from the most important and evident collaboration in 
space exploration stems from ideological differences with the United States. The US’ 
objection to China’s participation stems from an ideological dispute between US 
politicians, or more particularly Congressman Frank Wolf, and the Chinese government. 
Specifically the objections have been related to China’s political system and the 
involvement of the PLA in civilian space activities. Since Brazil’s acceptance into the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 China Manned Space Engineering Office. “Tiangong I / Shenzhou X Manned Spaceflight Mission.” 
Web. Accessed 14 Oct 2013. http://en.cmse.gov.cn/list.php?catid=207  
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program the salience of ideological differences becomes more apparent as the US’ 
concern of sufficient technological capabilities in space technologies does not hold as 
China is seen as possessing a higher capability than Brazil.201  
The three space project case studies provide insight into foreign policy 
considerations by highlighting how the international environment has enabled and 
constrained China’s opportunities for international cooperation. Together these cases 
demonstrate how the increasingly participatory character of space exploration has 
allowed domestic actors within China to cooperate with domestic actors in other 
countries. The responsibilities delegated to China in the Kuafu case suggest that the 11 
contributing countries did not object to China having a critical-path role in providing the 
launching vehicle. Although there were some practical impediments in each case, and the 
consequences of the Sino-US relationship, the international environment seems to be 
showing an acceptance of China as a lead partner in space exploration missions.  
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4. Conclusions  	  
The goal of this study was to define the calculation of China’s political utility 
gained from cooperating with international partners in specific space exploration projects. 
Guided by liberal international relations theory it was necessary to analyze China’s 
national space policy by considering complex bargaining processes occurring 
domestically as well as foreign policy considerations imposed by the conditions of the 
international environment. In this pursuit two domestic space programs and three 
international space projects were selected as case studies to determine China’s 
motivations for supporting and participating in each activity.  
Two main findings emerge from the Project 921 and Chang’e case studies that 
provide insight into China’s policy parameters. First, national prestige as the primary 
driver is supported by a generalizable view that the cost-benefit of human spaceflight 
relative to robotic missions is much higher and from the original proposal of the Chang’e 
program to be created as a prestige-building event. The limitation of national prestige as a 
primary driver however can be seen in the number of scientific justifications that needed 
to be made through feasibility studies to obtain political support for the programs. This 
point is strengthened by the inclusion of both programs as mega-engineering projects in 
the MLP. Second, space exploration was found to be key part of the national strategy for 
economic development. The push for indigenous innovation enables China to generate a 
high-skilled domestic workforce capable of supporting a competitive space industry; 
growth in the space industry will help facilitate an increased role for innovation in 
China’s economy. Together these findings provide caution in over-emphasizing national 
prestige as the driving justification for the Chinese human spaceflight and lunar 
exploration programs. Instead it is found that economic development and progress in 
S&T development are also significant drivers. 
The space project case studies demonstrate how the international environment 
constrains and enables China’s opportunities for international cooperation. It was found 
that China had achieved a high level of collaboration with many international partners, 
specifically in the Kuafu project. Furthermore the international environment was found to 
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have enabled collaboration among a variety of domestic actors from different countries 
with similar space exploration objectives. Partnerships were constructed synergistically, 
with China providing space experiment payloads and launching vehicles. These projects 
therefore provided opportunities for China’s space sector to gain much indigenous 
experience in developing space technologies and space science projects. Constraints 
imposed by the international environment were found to be consistent with general 
barriers to international cooperation as well as induced by the role of the PLA in China’s 
space activities. The most salient impediment to further international cooperation was the 
Sino-US relationship that still excludes China’s participation in the ISS. When looking at 
the whole it is clear that China has taken advantage of other opportunities for 
international cooperation despite being excluded from the ISS. As new actors gain power 
in space activities the options for cooperation available to China will continue to increase. 
The cooperation achieved in the Kuafu and Yinghuo-1 projects however show that 
collaboration is still limited as there was no significant joint development of space 
technologies and space science experiments.  
From the findings of this work it is possible to vet claims made in existing 
literature about international cooperation in space exploration. First, results from the 
space project case studies provide support for the Space Exploration 3.0 view of the 
international environment. Collaborations in these projects were supported from a variety 
of actors, most notably university scientists and various research institutes. This indicates 
that space exploration is becoming increasingly participatory from a proliferation of 
actors. The findings also highlight the use of bilateral and multilateral international 
coordination mechanisms as a means to initiate project cooperation. This is seen in the 
three space projects where Kuafu was proposed at an international conference, Yinghuo-1 
through a bilateral agreement, and the ISS through a serious of intergovernmental 
agreements and memorandum of understandings. 
Both programs are also deeply integrated with China’s national economic and 
S&T development plans; their inclusion in the MLP and ability to be used as platforms 
for indigenous innovation highlight the role of these two programs in this development. 
This provides support for the ‘comprehensive’ view of China’s space activities endorsed 
by Chinese scholars. It is possible that the motivations for initial program approval and 
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those for continued program support differ. As suggested by Space Exploration 3.0 
motivations for space exploration will extend towards economic and scientific reasons. 
The central role of China’s human spaceflight and lunar exploration programs in their 
national development strategy provides evidence for this perspective.  
The findings of this paper aid in better defining China’s policy parameters that 
influence their position towards international cooperation. However the scope and 
limitations of this work is necessary so as not to overstep the implications of the findings. 
First the selected space projects are all with the domain of space science, a relatively non-
sensitive area for international cooperation. Joint design and development of space 
technologies would require a much higher level of trust between partners and is left to 
future work. Second, due to the unavailability of an adequate framework to measure the 
impact of various criteria within a country’s policy parameters the findings of this work 
do not intend to make solid claims about which criteria should be prioritized. Instead the 
findings help contextualize space projects within a number of domestic and foreign 
policy considerations and point towards criteria that should be targeted for further, in-
depth analysis.  
It should also be noted the author attempted to collect interview data to verify the 
findings of this research. However due to an insufficient response rate from prominent 
academics with relevant expertise this dataset was abandoned.202 Furthermore the author 
held informal meetings with representatives from CASC, CASIC, CNSA, NSSC and 
CAS at the 64th IAC in Beijing in September 2013. Although these meetings were not 
formal interviews they did provide a background understanding of the space sector in 
China in addition to receiving official handouts from each organization. Requests from 
these organizations regarding more detailed information about cooperation on past 
projects however was stonewalled as each organization subsequently informed the author 
via email that they were not permitted to provide such data. These barriers represent 
some of the challenges researchers face when gathering data on space-related issues in 
China. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 A questionnaire was sent with five questions that included the general policy parameters considered by 
states when evaluating an opportunity for international cooperation. Eight academics were identified from 
Fudan University, Peking University and Tsinghua University, however only one response was received. 
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Existing literature does not adequately describe how countries calculate their 
political utility gained from cooperation. The extent to which ‘policy parameters’ have 
been developed is insufficient to allow for a thorough investigation. This work suggests 
that two areas would be particularly useful for future, serious investigations. First it is 
necessary to develop a methodology to measure the relative importance of different 
policy parameters. For example it might be possible to gauge the relative importance of 
national prestige against S&T development goals by investigating how stringent the 
science-justification vetting process is for space missions. Furthermore methods to 
measure government strategic communication related to garner national prestige and their 
actual impact on popular opinion would be useful. Methodologies would need to be 
developed to measure each criterion so as to be able to weight their relative importance. 
Building on the recommendation above a systematic analytical framework utilizing 
weighted criteria would provide significant benefit for future investigations. This 
systematization would reduce errors that may result from subjective interpretation, which 
has been especially problematic in trying to decipher the complexity of China’s space 
program.  
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Image: Complete Tiangong Space Station with Shenzhou spacecraft. 
Source: China Daily. Available at: http://moonandback.com/2012/06/18/shenzhou-9-
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Source: Xinhua News. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/photo/2012-
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Image: 3 stages of Chang’e program.  
Source: Xinhua News. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-
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